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ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW
Gillian E. Metzger*

Much has changed in constitutional law since 1975 when Henry Monaghan published his
Harvard Law Review Foreword on Constitutional Common Law.1 Whole areas of doctrine have
been born — and in some cases died.2 Yet Constitutional Common Law remains remarkably au
courant. Indeed, it presaged several of the central themes in constitutional law scholarship over
the last decade, such as the role of the political branches and popular movements in
constitutional interpretation or the relationship of constitutional doctrine to constitutional
meaning.3 More importantly, the practice of constitutional common law continues to this day
and so too does the debate over its legitimacy.
By constitutional common law Monaghan referred to “a substructure of substantive,
procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by,
various constitutional provisions . . . [and] subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal
by Congress.”4 Such common law rules, he argued, represent “a surprising amount of what
passes as authoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’”—a feature of our constitutional practice
obscured by the “mystique surrounding Marbury v. Madison5 and the Marbury view of the Court
as the “authoritative and final” determiner of constitutional meaning.6 Monaghan gave several
examples of this phenomenon, moving from structural matters like the dormant Commerce
Clause to individual liberties, most famously some of the Court’s seminal criminal procedure
rulings such as the warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona.7 In each of these contexts, the

*

Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Special thanks to Mitchell Berman, Ariela Dubler, Henry
Monaghan, Trevor Morrison, Peter Strauss.
1
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term — Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975).
2
Contemporary constitutional doctrine allowing limits on campaign contributions, for example, was born
in 1976 with the Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), rose to its heights in Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) and now seems headed for extinction. The extensive constitutional case law on the
use of race in affirmative action has also grown up in this period, starting with Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 435 U.S. 265 (1978).
3
The scholarship on each of these topics is extensive, so the following list makes no attempt to be
comprehensive. For discussions of the role of the political branches and social movements in constitutional
interpretation, see, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review
(2004); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (1999):
Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594 (2005); Robert Post
& Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1027 (2004).
For discussions of the relationship between constitutional doctrine and constitutional meaning, see Richard Fallon,
Implementing the Constitution (2001) [hereinafter Fallon, Implementing]; Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev.1] (2004), Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes
What the Court Does, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1649 (2005); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 190 (1988).
4
Monaghan, supra note , at 2-3.
5
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6
Monaghan, supra note , at 2-3.
7
384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966); Monaghan, supra note , at 3-25.
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Court expressly acknowledged that its constitutional rulings were to some extent revisable by
Congress.8
From the outset, some scholars have condemned constitutional common law as
illegitimate judicial lawmaking or alternatively as insufficiently protective of constitutional
rights.9 Indeed, the Court itself was notably ambivalent about Congress’s ability to revise judicial
constitutional determinations.10 Over the years, the Court has become more reluctant to
characterize its constitutional rulings as contingent or acknowledge a robust role for Congress in
constitutional individual rights interpretation. The 2001 decision in United States v. Dickerson is
a prime exemplar of this trend: While not insisting that “the Miranda warnings are required by
the Constitution, in the sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements,”
the Court there concluded that the Miranda warnings represented a constitutional rule binding on
Congress, at least to the extent of necessitating invalidation of a congressional statute that the
Court characterized as intended to overrule Miranda.11 Similarly indicative is the Court’s greater
scrutiny of congressional enactments under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
insistence in that context on Marbury-style judicial review with the Court as the supreme arbiter
of constitutional meaning.12 Significantly, the Court also has not identified a role for Congress
when expanding the scope of constitutional protections, thus signaling that its reluctance to
involve Congress is not simply a reflection of a narrower view of the constitutional rights
involved.13
8

See Monaghan, supra note , at 11, 20, 27-30; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972);
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; Prudential Ins. co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946); see also Bush v. Lucas, 462
U.S. 367, 389-90 (1983) (post-Constitutional Common Law decision bearing out Monaghan’s prediction that
congressional actions may determine whether a Bivens action will lie).
9
See infra TAN 86-91. Indeed, some scholars have rejected Monaghan’s claims that these decisions
represent constitutional common law at all. See, e.g., Grano, supra note, at 103, 119-22 (arguing that included in
constitutional common law are “rules that really belong to the Marbury tradition,” including rules with respect to the
right to counsel); Schrock & Welsh, supra note , at 1138-40 (rejecting argument that Congress’s power to authorize
dormant commerce clause violations is an instance of constitutional common law)
10
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 385 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 & 652-56 (1966) (upholding congressional
prohibition on many English literacy voting qualifications and stating that “it is enough that we be able to perceive a
basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict” between state interests and constitutional concerns about
ending discrimination in governmental services and in voting qualifications, but adding that Congress lacks power to
dilute judicially determined constitutional protections).
11
530 U.S. 428, 437-43 (2000). Dickerson is ambiguous as to whether a congressional effort to replace the
Miranda warnings would be constitutionally acceptable, limiting itself to noting that the substitute Congress
enacted, a totality of the evidence analysis, was not adequate and was rejected by the Court in Miranda itself. Id. at
441-43. Even so, the Court’s characterization of the warnings as a constitutional rule contrasts notably with its
earlier, post-Miranda precedent that described the warnings as not constitutionally mandated and other decisions
more overtly acknowledging a role for the political branches. See id. at 450-454 (describing and quoting from
intervening decisions stating that the Miranda warnings were not constitutionally protected); see also Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000) (describing Anders rule for when appointed counsel have fulfilled their duties of
representation on appeal as a prophylactic rule and stating that “States are free to adopt different procedures, so long
as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant’s right to appellate counsel”); Kermit Roosevelt III,
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1668-72 (2005)
(discussing Dickerson and Smith).
12
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), see also Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374
(2001).
13
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008) (making no reference to a
congressional role in defining the scope of the Second Amendment right to possess a gun for self-defense in the
home, other than noting that longstanding prohibitions on firearms possession were not being called into question);
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (making no reference to alternative rules that Congress or the states
could adopt in holding that the Confrontation Clause bars testimonial out-of-court statements by witnesses). The
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Yet the Court’s resistance to acknowledging constitutional interpretive plurality has not
spelled the end of constitutional common law. One area in which constitutional common law
remains particularly prevalent, though largely unrecognized as such, is ordinary administrative
law.14 Administrative law is generally understood as having constitutional as well as what I will
call “ordinary law” components, with ordinary law here referring to statutory and regulatory
requirements, such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)15 or Executive Order 12866,16
and associated administrative law doctrines.17 What is less often acknowledged, particularly by
courts, is the degree to which constitutional concerns permeate ordinary administrative law, in
particular doctrines of judicial review of agency action. A striking example of this lack of
acknowledgment is the decision last term in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Fox
Television Stations, in which the Court expressly refused to link ordinary administrative law to
constitutional concerns.18
Fox involved a challenge to the FCC’s new policy imposing greater restrictions on
broadcast of indecent language. In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected the claim that the FCC had
failed to adequately justify its change in policy and thereby violated the APA’s prohibition on
arbitrary and capricious agency action. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was primarily focused
on defeating the suggestion that an agency necessarily faces a higher burden to explain a change
in existing policy than in adopting a new policy when none previously had existed.19 But the
opinion also denied that agency decisions implicating constitutional liberties trigger more
stringent arbitrary and capricious review. Instead, the Court said, whether an agency action is

closest the Court has come to acknowledging an implementation role for the political branches (state as well as
federal) was its decision this last Term in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2009 WL 1789468 (June 25, 2009), in
which it noted with seeming approval state notice-and-demand statutes as a mechanism for meeting the demands of
the Confrontation Clause. See id. at *12; see also Jennifer Sokoler, []. In another decision last term, Corley v.
United States, 2009 WL 901513 (Apr. 6, 2009) the Court accepted without discussion Congress’s power to limit the
Court’s McNabb-Mallory doctrine excluding confessions made during periods of unreasonable delay before
presentment to a judge, but this reflected the understanding of McNabb-Mallory as an exercise of the Court’s
supervisory power over the federal courts rather than a constitutionally mandated requirement that would apply to
state courts as well.
14
Many of Monaghan’s specific examples remain good law as well, particularly those involving
constitutional structure, such as the dormant commerce clause and interstate water pollution. Recent decisions on
Bivens actions all fall into the constitutional common law mold, although the Court’s recent Bivens jurisprudence
also reveals substantial retrenchment in the availability of Bivens actions. See Fallon et al. eds., Hart & Wechsler’s
the Federal Courts 660-63, 733-42 (6th ed. 2009); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV and Interstate
Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1480--85 (2007) (describing Congress’s power to authorize state violations of
the dormant commerce clause). Perhaps the most frequently instance of constitutional common law today, however,
is application of the constitutional canons in statutory interpretation. See infra TAN 132-136.
15
5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2006)
16
3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
17
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs Assn v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (explicating
meaning of APA “arbitrary and capricious” standard). See also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 463-64 (2003) [hereinafter
Bressman, Beyond Accountability] (distinguishing between ordinary administrative law and constitutional
administrative law).
18
129 S.Ct. 1800, 1811--12 (2009) (“If the Commission’s action here was not arbitrary or capricious in the
ordinary sense, it satisfies the Administrative Procedure Act's “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard; its lawfulness
under the Constitution is a separate question to be addressed in a constitutional challenge.”).
19
Id. at 1811(stating “no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement
that all agency change be subjected to more searching review.”)
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“arbitrary and capricious” and whether it is unconstitutional are “separate question[s].”20
Arguing that the canon of constitutional avoidance applied only to judicial review of statutory
language, Justice Scalia stated that “the only context in which constitutionality bears upon
judicial review of authorized agency action” is when a court determined the action is
unconstitutional.21 He dismissed the dissent’s suggestion that the agency be required to
reconsider its policy in light of constitutional concerns, terming such an approach “judicial armtwisting or appellate review by the wagged finger.”22
Simply stated, my argument here is that Fox is wrong, and importantly so. The Court’s
protestations aside, constitutional concerns often affect judicial review of authorized executive
action. In fact, constitutional law and ordinary administrative law are inextricably linked:
Statutory and regulatory measures are created to address constitutional requirements;
constitutional concerns, particularly those sounding in separation of powers, underlie core
ordinary administrative law doctrines; and agencies are encouraged to take constitutional
concerns seriously in their decisionmaking. The net result is that a fair amount of ordinary
administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law. Its doctrines and requirements are
constitutionally informed but rarely constitutionally mandated, with Congress and agencies
enjoying broad power to alter specific administrative mechanisms notwithstanding their
constitutional aspect.
Recognizing the interrelationship between constitutional law and ordinary administrative
law is important both for the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of constitutional common law
and for proper appreciation of the role administrative agencies can play in our constitutional
order. Underlying many attacks on constitutional common law is a view of constitutional law as
having a narrow and determinate scope, with a clear divide separating constitutional and
nonconstitutional law. Yet in the context of administrative law at least, this divide simply does
not exist. Although some administrative law requirements are plainly constitutionally required
and others clearly rooted only in statutory or regulatory enactments, a number of basic doctrines
occupy a middle ground. The latter are simultaneously based in ordinary law and constitutional
law, and these two dimensions are too overlapping and interactive to be isolated.
Administrative law thus suggests that the vision of constitutional law as a distinct and
determinate entity is a false one. Moreover, this overlapping and interactive relationship
between the constitutional and ordinary dimensions of administrative law, combined with
Congress’s broad control over the latter, is what serves to transform ordinary administrative law
into a species of constitutional common law.
Of course, that as a descriptive matter judges infuse constitutional values into their
development of administrative law doctrines or readings of ordinary administrative requirements
does not, standing alone, suffice to justify the practice. But this deeply embedded practice does
indicate the degree of disruption that would result were constitutional common law extirpated
from administrative law. Moreover, the normative basis needed to justify such a disruption is
lacking. In particular, seeking to enforce constitutional norms through ordinary administrative
law better accords with constitutional principles than efforts to segregate out the two. This is
true of judicial development of administrative law doctrines that respond to constitutional
concerns associated with administrative government---such as doctrinal authorization for at times
quite searching scrutiny of the reasonableness of agency decisionmaking. Such doctrines are
closely akin to other common moves in the judicial constitutional law repertoire, in particular
20

Id. at 1812.
Id.
22
id. at 1812 n.3
21
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constitutional avoidance canons. Addressing these concerns through ordinary administrative law
preserves a degree of flexibility that better accommodates changing regulatory needs and
Congress’ primacy in structuring government than more immutable constitutional law
prescriptions, and is also more likely to yield meaningful constraints.
But the benefits of addressing constitutional concerns through ordinary administrative
law are especially evident with respect to the form of administrative constitutionalism
condemned in Fox: Judicial use of ordinary administrative law to encourage agencies to take
constitutional concerns seriously in their own decisionmaking. Administrative agencies today
are responsible for much of the federal government’s decisionmaking. Excluding such primary
decisionmakers from a judicially enforceable obligation to take constitutional concerns seriously
in wielding their delegated authority is at odds with the structural imperatives of our
constitutional system. Agencies are not only well positioned to enforce constitutional norms
effectively, but they are also better able than courts to determine how to incorporate
constitutional concerns into a given regulatory scheme with the least disruption. In addition, it is
far easier for agencies to respond to judicial decisions remanding administrative decisions for
failure to take account of constitutional concerns than for Congress to respond to judicial
narrowing of statutes through application of constitutional canons or judicial invalidation of
measures on constitutional grounds. As a result, segregating constitutional law concerns from
ordinary administrative law may well cause greater intrusion on the policymaking prerogatives
of the political branches rather than linking the two.
To my mind, the better critique is not the extent to which constitutional common law
surfaces in administrative contexts, but rather the lack of transparency that accompanies it. The
causes of the Court’s reluctance to acknowledge the constitutional dimension of ordinary
administrative law are murky, but likely center on concerns with preserving the proper judicial
role---both ensuring that courts do not intrude onto the policymaking prerogatives of the political
branches and with protecting the Court’s supremacy in constitutional interpretation. Whatever
the cause, the harmful effects of this reluctance are evident. Judicial failure to openly
acknowledge the constitutional role played by ordinary administrative law has left our
understandings of the constitutional demands imposed on the modern administrative state
underdeveloped and untested by criticism. This failure has further meant that the capacity of
administrative agencies to advance and protect constitutional norms remains largely unexploited.
At the same time, judicial obfuscation has undermined the extent to which agencies are held
accountable for the constitutional judgments they do make.
In what follows, Part I identifies a number of ways that constitutional concerns permeate
ordinary administrative law and argues that the net result is best understood as constitutional
common law. Part II then analyzes the implications of this characterization of ordinary
administrative law for the debate over constitutional common law and seeks to justify the use of
ordinary administrative law to ensure that administrative agencies take constitutional concerns
seriously in their decisionmaking.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW IN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXTS
Constitutional law regularly surfaces in administrative contexts, shaping how agencies
make decisions, the substance of those decisions, and judicial review of agency decisionmaking.
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Yet that role is surprisingly unacknowledged and unspecified, particularly by courts.23 Similarly
unremarked is the influence that ordinary administrative law has on defining the scope of
constitutional rights. These two features—the tacit and indeterminate role played by
constitutional concerns, as well as the reciprocal relationship between statutory or regulatory
administrative mechanisms and constitutional requirements—mean that Congress has power
over the substance of administrative law, including its constitutional components. Combined
with the evolving and emergent quality of many ordinary administrative law doctrines, the net
result is a form of constitutional common law.
A. Connections Between Constitutional Law and Ordinary Administrative Law
Constitutional law’s manifestations in administrative contexts can usefully be divided
into three categories. First, ordinary administrative law provides mechanisms that are either
constitutionally-mandated or that avoid constitutional violations. Second, constitutional norms
and concerns underlie and are evident in a number of administrative law doctrines. Third, both
courts and the political branches sometimes use doctrinal mechanisms or substantive
requirements to encourage agencies to take constitutional concerns seriously, with the result that
constitutional concerns influence the shape of agency decisionmaking.
1. Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutionally Mandated. The most obvious point
of contact between ordinary administrative law and constitutional law is that ordinary
administrative constraints on executive officials are sometimes constitutionally required.
Perhaps the classic example is provisions for administrative hearings, which are often adopted to
satisfy procedural due process’s requirements of notice and some opportunity for a hearing.24
Another instance involves the First Amendment. The Court has repeatedly held that
administrative licensing systems or other forms of prior restraint based upon the content of
speech must contain objective standards to circumscribe official discretion in order to be
constitutional, as well as procedural safeguards such as the right for speedy judicial review of
any administrative license denial.25 Most recently, the Court’s decisions on parade licensing

23

Scholars periodically notice the constitutional underpinnings of ordinary administrative law doctrines.
See, e.g., Bressman, Beyond Accountability:,at 468; Kevin A. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery,
116 Yale L. J. 952, 958-59 (2007); see also William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable Value of Amending the
APA, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 979, 1002 (2004) (noting “the maxim that administrative law is applied constitutional
law”).
24
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, (2005) (detailing administrative system used for
classifying prisoners for supermax, which included provisions for notice, hearing, and internal review, and
concluding that this system, devised on the eve of trial, satisfied procedural due process requirements); see also
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of
Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 Yale L. J. 2, 31 (2008) (arguing that in a number of instances the government is
required to use elaborate procedures if adopting a constitutionally doubtful decision).
25
See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 133 (1992) (emphasizing lack of objective standards for fee assessments, lack of requirement that county
administrator explain fee decisions and lack of reviewing as basis for holding county parade fee ordinance
unconstitutional); see also Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of
the Modern First Amendment, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (discussing the historical intertwining of free speech claims
and administrative law).
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have underscored the importance of officials being required to explain their decisions, a typically
administrative requirement.26
In other contexts, specific administrative mechanisms are not constitutionally mandated
but suffice to avoid constitutional violations. A prime example here arises in regard to Bivens
actions.27 On several occasions, the Court has identified the availability of administrative
complaint systems by which harmed individuals could obtain redressto redress individual harms
as a factor counting against implying a Bivens damages remedy.28 Yet another example is the
separation of functions requirements of the APA and other provisions for independent agency
review. 29 Although the Court has rejected the claim that combining investigative and
adjudicatory functions necessarily violates due process, it has also acknowledged the possibility
that such a combination may undermine an individual’s due process right to an unbiased
decisionmaker.30 Such a possibility is forestalled, however, by the APA’s separation of
functions requirements. Indeed, due process concerns underlay Congress’s decision to include
these provisions as well as detailed procedural protections for formal agency adjudication in the
APA.31 Like the procedural process and First Amendment licensing decisions discussed above,
constitutional concerns are acknowledged to be in play in these contexts. But the Court has not
held these administrative mechanisms to be constitutionally required, instead concluding they are
adequate to avoid constitutional violation. The result is that governments enjoy greater
discretion in shaping these administrative mechanisms as they determine best.32

26

See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 133; see also Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2202)
(upholding a parade licensing scheme that limited the factors government officials could consider, required that
reasons for any denials be clearly explained, and were subject to review); Seattle Affiliate of Oct. 22nd Coalition v.
City of Seattle, 550 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has expressed particular concern about
statutes that do not require the licensor to provide any explanation for his decision, and where that decision is
unreviewable”) (internal quotations and additions omitted).
27
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (recognizing an implied
private right of actions for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated constitutional rights).
28
See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S 537, 2598-2600, 2604-05 (2007) (emphasizing availability of existing
mechanisms by which respondent could have obtained administrative review and subsequently judicial review of
almost all challenged actions by federal officials and ultimately concluding that this availability, along with
functional concerns, made implying a Bivens action inappropriate); Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S.
61, 74 (2001) (noting respondents had full access to administrative remedy program in course of refusing to infer a
Bivens action against private prison corporation); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (emphasizing
administrative review process available to social security disability claimants, including option of seeking judicial
review once administrative remedies exhausted, in refusing to imply a Bivens action); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
386 (1983) (concluding that administrative system created by Congress “provides meaningful remedies for
employees who may have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments about their agencies” and refusing
to create a Bivens action to vindicated employees’ First Amendment rights).
29
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-57.
30
See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46--55 (1975) (rejecting claim that combination of investigative and
adjudicatory functions necessarily violates due process); see also In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955)
(holding that procedure under which judge charged witnesses with contempt and also tried and convicted them
violated due process).
31
See Jordan, 299-312; Shepperd, Fierce Compromise.
32
This is particularly true in contrast to the First Amendment licensing context, where the Court has
imposed fairly specific procedural requirements. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133
(1992). The Court is often quite deferential to governmental choices in assessing procedural due process challenges.
See, e.g., Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323-26 (1985) (emphasizing great weight
due government’s desire to preserve informality and non-adversarial character of veterans’ benefits system).
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Ordinary administrative law can also serve a greater avoidance role, not only guarding
against recognized constitutional violations but further allowing courts to avoid even addressing
some constitutional issues at all. Again, procedural due process provides a case in point.
Although the Court periodically insists that procedural due process imposes no significant
constraints on general policymaking, in doing so it relies on precedents going back to the
beginning of the twentieth century, before the advent of the modern administrative state, and in
contexts in which substantial opportunity for notice and comment had been provided.33 The
Court has not had to address the question of whether procedural due process requires some
minimal level of notice and opportunity to be heard in regard to regulatory rulemaking in its
modern form---in which rulemaking is pervasive and agencies exercise broad discretion in
devising requirements that can have substantial impact on identified groups---because the APA
already mandates such procedures.34 Similarly, Lisa Bressman has argued that the availability of
ordinary administrative law doctrines prohibiting arbitrary agency decisionmaking has allowed
the Court to avoid determining whether the Constitution requires agencies to issue standards to
guide exercise of their delegated powers.35
2. Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutionally Inspired.
The description of
ordinary administrative law as allowing courts to avoid constitutional issues is only partially
accurate. It fails to capture the ways that constitutional concerns have shaped development of
ordinary administrative law doctrines—sometimes overtly, often tacitly. The central exemplar
of this phenomenon is the emergence of hard look review of agency decisionmaking. The
APA’s prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action is today read as providing the basis
for at times quite searching judicial scrutiny. As the Court stated in its famous decision in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company: “Agencies
are required to “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action[,] including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,’”36 and
courts are instructed to set aside agency action if they find an agency “relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before [it] or is
[too] implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view of the product of agency
expertise.”37 It is generally accepted, at least by scholars, that “arbitrary and capricious” review
under State Farm is a far cry from the lenient scrutiny originally intended by the Congress that
adopted the APA. When the APA was adopted, “arbitrary and capricious” was understood to
entail the same minimal scrutiny as constitutional rationality review. Over the years, however,
33
See, e.g., United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 (1973) (invoking Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S. 783 (1910) and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)) and
holding procedural due process did not require additional procedures in rulemaking in which Court concluded that
the agency’s ultimate notice “could not have been more explicit or detailed” and interested parties had sufficient
time to present objections); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (citing
BiMetallic and Florida East Coast and stating “[s]ince this was clearly a rulemaking proceeding in its purest form,
we see nothing to support [the] view” that “additional procedural devices were required under the Constitution,” in
regard to a rulemaking in which agency had provided detailed notice, including underlying staff reports, and held an
oral hearing).
34
See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
35
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 518 (2003); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 452, 459-66 (2001).
36
Motor Vehicle Mfrs Assn v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
37
Id. at 43.
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the courts came to read arbitrary and capricious in a far more rigorous fashion until it came to
embody today’s hard look review.38
Part of the explanation for this expansion of substantive judicial scrutiny of agency
decisionmaking lies in constitutional concerns with the broad delegations of power to agencies
and the attendant risk of unaccountable and arbitrary exercises of administrative power.
Intensified judicial scrutiny of administrative actions developed in response to the dramatic
expansion in regulatory authority that attended enactment of major environmental, health and
safety, and consumer protection statutes during the 1960s and 1970s. This period was also
marked by increasing loss of faith in administrative expertise and fears of agency capture by
regulated interests.39 The requirement that agencies supply a substantial, contemporaneous, and
reasoned explanation for their decisions exerts a powerful disciplining force on the agency’s
decisionmaking process.40 In particular, hard look review prioritizes expertise and technocratic
decisionmaking within the agency, in the process downplaying more raw political
considerations.41 At the same time, requiring that agencies explain and justify their actions also
arguably reinforces political controls, by helping to ensure that Congress and the President are
aware of what agencies are doing.42
In short, this basic requirement of reasoned explanation is central to alleviating core
separation of powers concerns associated with the administrative state.43 In his Fox concurrence
Justice Kennedy recently noted this constitutional connection, describing the reasoned
decisionmaking requirement as “stem[ming] from the administrative agency’s unique
38

See Alfred C. Aman, Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise
of the Administrative Presidency, 73 Corn. L. Rev. 1101, 110 n.28, 1134-43 (1988); Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1300-1315 (1986). For an example of the type of
deferential scrutiny originally thought to be the measure of arbitrary and capriciousness review, see Pac. States Box
& Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1935).
39
See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and The Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1039, 103944, 1059-67 (1997); Rabin, supra note , at 1308-13; see also Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A
Cautionary Tale of Judicial Review and Nuclear Waste, in Administrative Law Stories 125, 143-48 (Peter L.
Strauss, ed. 2006) (tracing the D.C. Circuit’s responses to concerns about agency accountability presented by
expanded rulemaking).
40
Some scholars say too disciplining. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto
Safety 224-28 (1990); R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act 294-98 (1983);
McGarrity, 75 tex l rev 525, 549. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1387-96, 1400-03, 1419 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 60-62, 65-68(1995). For more optimistic accounts of the benefits of hard look
review, see William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L. J. 38, 59-60 (1975);
Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L.
Rev. 486, 490-91, 522-26, 543-47 (2001).
41
See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing A Place for Politics in Arbitrary-and-Capricious Review, SSRN draft at
18, 21-22 (forthcoming 119 Yale Law Journal); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From
Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 54, 64-65 (2007).
42
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1749,
1780-83 (2007), McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org.
243, 257-58 (1987); Kevin A. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 Yale L. J. 952, 958-59 (2007).
43
See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of
Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 Duke L. J. 387, 425-28; Stack,
supra note , at 992-1000; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United
States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 99, 111 (2007) (noting the constitutional
basis of the reasoned decisionmaking requirement); Richard W. Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control Over the
“Hard Look,” 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1125, 1132-34 (2004) (same).
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constitutional position” and the danger that “[i]f agencies were permitted unbridled discretion,
their actions might violate important principles of separation of powers and checks and
balances.”44 The Court implicitly made such a link in State Farm, emphasizing the difference
between statutes and administrative action and arguing that the latter did not merit the same
“presumption of constitutionality” and minimal rationality review due the former.45 Similarly, as
Kevin Stack demonstrated in his recent article on the landmark SEC v. Chenery decision, the
demand that agencies offer a contemporaneous statement of the grounds for their actions derives
from modern constitutional concerns about delegation of authority to administrative agencies.46
The Court made this connection express in opinions issued in the early decades of the twentieth
century, as the modern administrative state was beginning to emerge, stating “[i]n creating such
an administrative agency, the Legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative
power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the
performance of its function.”47
Today, however, the Court is less willing to acknowledge the constitutional basis of the
reasoned decisionmaking demand; Kennedy’s statement in Fox is unusual. Despite highlighting
the distinctive position of agencies, State Farm ultimately rooted hard look review simply in the
APA’s prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action, without addressing whether such
intense scrutiny was originally intended.48 Even more striking is the 2001 decision in American
Trucking Ass’ns v. Whitman. The Court there insisted that the constitutionality of a delegation
turns solely on whether Congress supplied an intelligible principle to guide the agency and not
on how the agency exercises its delegated power.49 Although the Court also indicated that what
counts as a constitutionally sufficient intelligible principle may vary with the scope and nature of
delegated responsibilities, unlike earlier precedent it treated the presence of alternative checks,
44

2009 WL 1118715 at 20; see also Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986). Jerry Mashaw
has argued that the core administrative law notion that “discretion is always conferred on administrators on the
implicit assumption that it will be reasonably exercised” is evident an 1815 separate opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall in Otis v. Watkins, 13 .S. (9 Cranch) 339, 358 (1815), although the Court itself rejected the requirement
that a government official must use “reasonable care in ascertaining the facts on which to form an opinion,” id. at
355-56. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 116 Yale
L. J. 1636, 1677-78 (2007).
45
463 U.S. at 43 n.9.
46
Stack, supra note , at 982-989; compare Ann Woolhandler, Delegation and Due Process: The Historical
Connection, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 225-26 (analyzing the effect of legislative delegation on procedural due
process and arguing that the Court initially imposed process requirements on delegees to ensure that their
determinations had factual support, but “later supplemented, or in some cases replaced, the requirement of process
with a requirement—enforced by judicial review—that the delegee’s action not be substantively arbitrary.”).
47
Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 260 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1922); see also Stack, supra
note , at 983--89 (discussing Wichita Railroad and similar contemporaneous decisions).
48
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-43; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415
(1971) (similarly invoking only the APA, though with general references to the appropriate roles of courts and
agencies). The Court’s refusal to address whether extensive substantive scrutiny accords with the intentions of
Congress in adopting the APA stands in particular contrast to its insistence that courts not impose procedural
controls beyond those in the APA. See Metzger, supra note 38, at 160-62; compare Vermont Yankee v. NRDC, 435
U.S. 519, 523-24, 543-44 (1978) with id. at 549.
49
531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). The specific issue in Whitman was whether an agency’s failure to adopt
determinative guidelines to limit its discretion created an unconstitutional delegation, but the Court’s insistence that
an agency’s actions in exercising its delegated authority are irrelevant to assessing the delegation’s constitutionality
would presumably extend to denying the relevance of whether the agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.
Whitman does not, however, exclude the possibility that the reasoned decisionmaking requirement is rooted in the
Due Process Clause.
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such as agency-promulgated limits or even judicial oversight, as irrelevant.50 The constitutional
forces that produced contemporary arbitrary and capriciousness review have thus faded from
immediate view, yet they nonetheless represent a fundamental basis on which this basic
administrative law doctrine rests.
The role that constitutional concerns play in inspiring ordinary administrative law is even
more evident in Chevron v. NRDC, which famously established the rule that courts should defer
to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes that the agencies are charged with
implementing.51 Chevron represents a mechanism for checking agencies somewhat different
from hard look review, in that it emphasizes political controls in addition to (some scholars argue
more than) agency reasoning and expertise.52 The Court’s explanation in Chevron for this
deference rule was cursory, but it suggested there that one basis was congressional intent,
arguing that in delegating implementation to an agency Congress was also implicitly delegating
gapfilling interpretive authority.53 But such an across-the board implication of congressional
intent is, of course, purely fictional.54 The real question is why read statutory delegations as
including implicit delegation of interpretive authority, rather than insist on courts exercising
independent judgment on questions of statutory meaning absent express instructions from
Congress to the contrary. The Court appears to have been influenced by separation of powers
and institutional competency concerns about the appropriate judicial role, combined with
recognition of the impossibility of separating questions of statutory meaning from questions of
50

Id. at 475. The Court’s refusal in Whitman to link judicial review to the constitutionality of delegations
was at odds with its opinion in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), which stated that “[t]he bicameral process is not
necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach
beyond the limits of the statute that created it” and emphasizing that “[t]he courts, when a case or controversy arises,
can always ‘ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed’ and can enforce adherence to statutory
standards.” Id. at 953 n. 16 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) and Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connolly, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759
(DDC 1971) (“Another feature that blunts the “blank check” rhetoric is the requirement that any action taken by the
Executive under the law, subsequent to the freeze, must be in accordance with further standards as developed by the
Executive.”); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 485-88 (1989) (detailing the shift in delegation doctrine between a focus on “power
divided to power kept in check”).
51
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). More specifically, Chevron famously established that courts are instructed to
undertake a two-step inquiry in assessing agency statutory interpretations: “At the first step, we ask whether the
statute's plain terms “directly addres[s] the precise question at issue.” Id, at 843. If the statute is ambiguous on the
point, we defer at step two to the agency's interpretation so long as the construction is “a reasonable policy choice
for the agency to make.” Id., at 845. Subsequent decisions have made clear that a court must initially establish that
“Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority” for Chevron deference to apply--a requirement occasionally referred to as Chevron’s step zero. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227
(2001).
52
See Bressman, supra note , at 1763-64; Watts, supra note , at 35-38. But see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer
or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 752 (2006) (“While Chevron
sensibly accepts the President's political role as mediating the difficulties of focused bureaucratic expertise, it does
not purport to displace reliance on the latter. . . . Not a word in Chevron suggests tolerance for the proposition that
decision could be made by anyone but the administrator of the EPA.”).
53
467 U.S. at 844.
54
See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 21625. Indeed, the Chevron Court appeared to acknowledge as much. See 467 U.S. at 865 (describing several possible
accounts of why Congress adopted the statutory language it did, and stating “[f]or judicial purposes, it matters not
which of these things occurred”).
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policy.55 Later in the opinion the Court acknowledged this constitutional basis for its approach,
emphasizing the impropriety of judges making policy decisions as well as the need to leave such
determinations to officials politically accountable through the President: “The responsibilities
for assessing the wisdom of . . . policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing
views of the public interest are not judicial ones. ‘Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in
the political branches.’”56
Constitutional values also surface expressly when the Court invokes constitutional canons
of interpretation in reading administrative statutes.57 For example, the Court has applied a
“strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action,” a
presumption rooted in both due process and separation-of-powers concerns.58 Just last term, in
Wyeth v. Levine, the Court relied in part on the federalism-inspired presumption against
preemption in refusing to defer to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s view that a state
law failure to warn suit was preempted by the FDA’s approval of the drug label at issue.59
Indeed, the Court has identified federalism concerns as supporting narrower interpretations of the
scope of an agency’s delegated authority or more aggressive statutory readings under step one of
Chevron even when the constitutional canons are not in play.60 Several scholars have argued that
nondelegation and other constitutional concerns underlie other notably narrow interpretations of
administrative statutes, though the Court has often been less open about the constitutional basis
of these decisions.61
55

See, e.g., Farina, supra note , at 456 (“Chevron invoked the principles of separation of powers and
legitimacy”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency
Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. l. Rev. 501, 505 (2005) (“Chevron relies on constitutional structure, Congress’s
legitimate authority to delegate lawmaking power. . . and [agencies’] political accountability”). Although most
agree that constitutional concerns were one basis for Chevron, the extent to which Chevron’s deference rule can be
constitutionally justified has sparked some controversy. Compare Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833, 870-73 (2001) (expressing doubt about constitutional basis and rooting
instead in presumed congressional intent) with Richard J. Pierce, reconciling Chevron with Stare Decisis, 85 Geo. L.
J. 2225, 2227 (1997) (defending Chevron as constitutionally based) and Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2086-91 (1990) (doubting separation of powers or congressional intent can
justify and arguing instead that institutional competency concerns provide a plausible justification)
56
Id. at 866 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)); see also id. (“[A]n agency to which Congress
has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely on the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy . . .. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is.”)
57
On the role of the canons and constitutional values in interpreting regulatory statutes, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 459, 469-74 (1989); see also William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1019-36 (1988) (discussing role
of constitutional values in statutory interpretation generally, not limited to administrative contexts); Jonathan R.
Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1024, 1032-79 (1998) (arguing
that background normative principles are central to interpretation of administrative law statutes, though not linking
these principles to specifically constitutional concerns).
58
Bowen v. Michigan Acad., 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); see also Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
140 (1967).
59
129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95,1198, 1200-1202 (2009). In like fashion, the constitutional avoidance canon in
particular is sometimes identified as a basis for denying the deference usually accorded reasonable agency statutory
interpretations of ambiguous statutes under Chevron. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991).
60
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 922-25 (2006) (emphasizing the federalism concerns raised by
the Attorney General’s interpretation of the CSA but holding that it was not necessary to employ a clear statement
rule or presumption against preemption to find the interpretation invalid); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as
the New Federalism, 57 Duke L. J. 2023, 2032-36, 2063-69 (2008).
61
See, e.g., Brown & Williamson v. FDA, [cite] (refusing to read the FDCA as authorizing FDA regulation
of tobacco, noting in part the substantial expansion in agency power that would result and stating that “Congress
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3. Encouraging Administrative Constitutionalism. The third connection between
ordinary administrative law and constitutional law is significantly different. Rather than
involving judicial assessment of constitutional requirements or judicial development of
administrative law doctrines to respond to constitutional concerns, the approach here centers on
encouraging agencies to take constitutional values and concerns into account in their
decisionmaking. The goal of such administrative constitutionalism is not simply avoiding
judicial invalidation of unconstitutional agency actions, but fostering a more affirmative and
independent agency role in implementing constitutional requirements. This version of the
constitutional law-administrative law interplay is the one curtly dismissed in Fox, and on other
occasions as well the Court has displayed ambivalence about encouraging such administrative
constitutionalism. Nonetheless, this linkage between constitutional law and administrative
decisionmaking surfaces with some regularity in judicial decisions, and it is often fostered by
political branch enactments.
A recent illustration came in Wyeth, issued just a month before Fox. In the course of
holding that courts ultimately have the power to decide when preemption exists, absent a
delegation to agencies of power to preempt, the Court emphasized that it often gives “some
weight” to an agency determination that state law would pose obstacles to a federal regulatory
scheme.62 According to the Court, the weight actually given to “the agency’s explanation of
state law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and
persuasiveness.”63 The Court then refused to defer to the FDA’s opinion that its approval of a
prescription drug label preempted state law failure to warn claims, noting the agency had
“reverse[d] [its] own longstanding position without providing a reasoned explanation” and
through a process that failed to offer “States or other interested parties notice or opportunity for
comment.”64 Wyeth’s net effect is to give agencies a clear incentive to take federalism concerns
raised by preemption seriously, solicit comment from affected governments, and carefully justify
any conclusion that state law would be an impediment to a federal regulatory scheme.
Another recent decision displaying this type of connection between constitutional law
and administrative decisionmaking is Boumediene v. Bush.65 In a 5-4 decision, the Court there
held that the Military Commissions Act’s restrictions on the ability of Guantanamo Bay
detainees to challenge their detention through habeas corpus constituted a violation of the
Suspension Clause.66 In so holding, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion underscored procedural
deficiencies with the government’s internal administrative proceedings, the combatant status
review tribunals (CSRTs), in the process repeatedly suggesting that use of more robust internal
procedural protections could lead to a different result. According to the Court, “the adequacy of
does not hide elephants in mouseholes”); see also John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of
Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 227 (2001) (characterizing Brown & Williamson as animated by nondelegation
concerns); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms
and Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Yale L. J. 545, 564-75, 580-600 (arguing that “phantom constitutional
norms”---norms rooted in due process, equal protection, and the First Amendment but fundamentally at odds with
plenary power doctrine---underlie many immigration decisions); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 315 (2000) (identifying a number of canons of statutory interpretation as motivated by nondelegation
concerns).
62
129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-1201 (2009).
63
Id. at 1201.
64
Id.
65
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
66
Id. at 2240.
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the process through which [a detainee’s] status determination was made” is a relevant factor “in
determining the reach of the Suspension Clause.”67 In addition, the Court emphasized that, in
determining whether alternative procedures provide an adequate substitute for habeas, “[w]hat
matters is the sum total of procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and
collateral.”68
Again, the effect is to give the government an incentive to craft internal
administrative procedures that address the constitutional weakness the majority identified in the
current system, specifically the detainees’ limited ability to challenge the factual basis on which
they are being held as enemy combatants, in order to limit the scope of subsequent judicial
review.69
Decisions applying the constitutional avoidance canon to agency-administered statutes
create similar incentives for agencies to take constitutional concerns seriously.70 Concern that a
reviewing court may invoke the canon in lieu of Chevron deference may lead an agency to
forego broad assertions of authority or interpretations of ambiguous statutes that tread close to
the constitutional pale. True, the agency thereby cedes some power it might prefer to preserve,
but it forestalls an independent judicial determination of statutory meaning that could more
seriously impinge on its authority.71 The immigration context provides a contemporary example
of this dynamic. In Zavydas v. Davis, the Court invalidated the government’s interpretation of
federal immigration statutes as authorizing indefinite detention aliens ordered removable. The
Court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance as support for reading the statutes as
authorizing only the detention of such aliens for a period reasonably necessary to secure their
removal.72 In response, the government promulgated a new interpretation of the governing
statute, one which preserved its authority to indefinitely detain some aliens but significantly
narrowed the categories of aliens over which it could exercise such authority. The government
argued in subsequent court challenges that its new regulation avoids the constitutional problems
with its prior approach and therefore qualifies for Chevron deference.73
67

Id. at 2259.
Id. at 2269; see also id. at 2268 (“the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of
any earlier proceedings”).
69
The Obama administration appears headed in this direction. See David Johnston, In the Senate, Debate
on Detainee Legal Rights, N.Y. Times, July 8, at A18.
70
See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189,
1197 (2006).
71
In Rapanos v. United States, Chief Justice Roberts noted this point in castigating the Army Corps of
Engineers and the EPA for failing to respond to a prior Supreme Court decision that had invoked constitutional
concerns as ground for refusing to defer to an agency interpretation of the Clean Water Act (CWA)’s scope. See
547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that given the “generous leeway [afforded agencies]
in interpreting the statute[s] they are entrusted to administer” and the “broad, somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless
clearly limiting terms” of the CWA, “the Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate in
developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their authority.”
72
533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) (holding that the
statutory interpretation of Zadyvas applies to aliens ordered removed who are inadmissible under the governing
statute) .
73
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14; see also INS, Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal,
66 Fed. Reg. 56967-01 (Nov. 14, 2001); Br. For Appellants, Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 2008 WL 2513972, at
*15-*26. A circuit split currently exists on the question of whether the government’s new regulation qualifies for
Chevron deference. Compare 547 F.3d 1237, 1245-56 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the new interpretation does not
raise serious constitutional doubts and that Chevron deference appropriate) with Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, (5th
Cir. 2008) (holding deference inappropriate); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of
Administrative Decisionmaking, 118 Yale L. J. 64, 76-84 (2008) (describing case law on the relationship between
the constitutional canons and Chevron deference).
68
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Decisions like Wyeth, Boumediene, and Zadyvas signal the important role that
administrative agencies play in ensuring that constitutional requirements are met. Initial
responsibility for addressing constitutional questions frequently falls to agencies. Moreover,
although their decisions are subject to judicial scrutiny, agencies nonetheless are able to exert
substantial influence in setting administrative policies or procedures that can have substantial
constitutional import. Recognition of their ability to limit subsequent judicial interventions on
constitutional grounds can be a powerful mechanism for encouraging agencies to take
constitutional concerns seriously.
Interestingly, however, the Court rarely discusses this incentivizing effect. Wyeth and
Boumediene are as express as it gets, and even there the Court spoke somewhat indirectly,
emphasizing that better agency decisionmaking and procedures might result in greater deference
or avoidance of judicially-imposed remedies rather than directly urging agencies to take
constitutional concerns more seriously. Similarly, the Court rarely overtly acknowledges the
incentives created by its constitutional canon decisions or its decisions holding that
administrative protections can satisfy constitutional individual rights requirements. Indeed, in
some contexts—the Fourth Amendment in particular—the Court has been notably reluctant to tie
satisfaction of constitutional requirements to use of administrative measures in a way that would
incentivize adoption of the latter.74 This is true even though the Court has implicitly linked these
two and acknowledged the potential constitutional benefits of administrative measures that limit
police officer discretion.75 Administrative constitutionalism is further discouraged by doctrines
excusing constitutional challenges from usual exhaustion requirements, as well as the standard
rule that “adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been
thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.”76
Of greater relevance here, to the extent the Court has sought to encourage agencies to
consider constitutional concerns, it has generally done so outside of ordinary administrative law
doctrines and direct administrative review. Although Wyeth involved the question of how much
deference to accord to an agency’s interpretation of a statute as preemptive, it arose—as has
much of the Court’s administrative preemption jurisprudence—in a state tort suit, not a direct

74

See United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 814-16 (1996) (rejecting Fourth Amendment claim even
though police officer’s stop of automobile did not conform to governing police regulations); David A. Sklansky,
Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1275-76 & nn. 161-63 (2002)
at 1276-78.
75
For implicit linkages, see e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987) (upholding warrantless
administrative inspections of closely regulated industries but only if, among other factors, the discretion of
inspecting officers is limited); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, __ (1990); see also Warren La
Fave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and
Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 442, 451-86 (1990); Sklansky, supra note , at 127576 & nn. 161-63 (listing examples). Academic commentators have long advocated reading the Fourth Amendment
to require administrative rulemaking, and the Court noted the idea supportively in dicta in United States v. Caceras,
440 U.S. 741, 755 (1979); see generally, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.
L. Rev. 349, 415-28 (1973); LaFave, supra note , at 448-51.
76
Thunder Basin Coal. Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). The Court’s
statements in this context have been somewhat ambivalent, as it has also emphasized that exhaustion “is not
mandatory,” id., and at times has urged the advantages of “provid[ing] the agency the opportunity to reconsider its
policies, interpretations, and regulations in light of . . . challenges,” including constitutional claims. Shalala v. Ill.
Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 24 (2000).
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challenge to administrative action.77 Boumediene also was a constitutional challenge to
executive action as violating the Habeas Clause, rather than an administrative law challenge.
And, finally, the Court has indicated that application of the constitutional canons trumps ordinary
administrative law deference doctrines.78 I have argued elsewhere that in recent decisions the
Court has appeared to use ordinary administrative law as a mechanism for vindicating
constitutional federalism concerns.79 But these judicial moves towards the use of ordinary
administrative law as a federalism surrogate are implicit and rarely acknowledged as such by the
Court.80 Thus, the Fox majority appears largely correct when it insisted that the Court has not
expressly employed ordinary administrative doctrines, in particular arbitrary and capriciousness
review, to force agencies to consider the constitutional implications of their actions.
Nonetheless, the incentives for agencies to address constitutional concerns administratively
remain present, even if ordinary administrative law is not usually the mechanism by which such
incentives are created.
The Court’s failure to encourage administrative constitutionalism through ordinary
administrative law stands in marked contrast to the approach taken by the political branches.
Congress and the President frequently impose statutory and regulatory restrictions on
administrative decisionmaking that reflect their desire for agencies to attend to constitutional
concerns. Such restrictions are particularly prevalent in the federalism context: Congress often
requires agencies to consult with states before taking certain actions and agencies must justify
imposition of particularly costly rules on states.81 The President has long sought “to ensure that
77

See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-86 (2000) (stating, in context of state tort
suit, that the Department of Transportation's position that a federal regulatory standard preempted the state tort
action at issue should be accorded “some weight,” but holding deference unnecessary to conclude that preemption
was appropriate); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1996)(stating, in context of state tort suit, that
Court’s determination that a statute did not preempt state tort claims was “substantially informed” by federal
regulations and that the agency's views of the statute should be given “substantial weight”); see also Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572-73 & n.13 (2007) (holding, in context of preemption declaratory judgment
action, that federal statute clearly preempted state action at issue and thus no need to reach question of deference due
federal agency’s preemption determination).
78
See, e.g., Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 2009 WL 1738645 at *9, *11-*13
(2009) (applying canon of constitutional doubt and rejecting implementing agency’s interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act without invoking deference); see also Bamberger, supra note , at 77-78 (analyzing the Court’s position
on the relationship of the canon of constitutional avoidance and Chevron deference).
79
In several instances—including Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), Massachusetts v. EPA, 127
S. Ct. 1438 (2007), and Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007)—the Court used aggressive Chevron step
zero or step one inquiries to avoid troubling federalism issues raised by federal agency preemption of state law. The
Court has also been more willing to defer to agency action when the record indicates that an agency has been
sensitive to the federalism implications of its actions.79 But these judicial moves towards the use of ordinary
administrative law as a federalism surrogate are implicit and rarely acknowledged as such by the Court. See
Metzger, supra note , at 2030-39, 2053-62. Notably, one recent occasion in which the Court did acknowledge that
federalism concerns affected its analysis—the discussion of state standing in Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1454-55—
involved application of constitutional jurisdictional requirements rather than ordinary administrative law.
80
See Metzger, supra note , at 2039, 2054-55, 2059-60. The Court has been more overt about this
connection in the past, much as it was previously more open about the constitutional bases of reasoned
decisionmaking. See, e.g., Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 211-12 (1931) “[W]henever the federal power is
exerted within what would otherwise be the domain of state power, the justification of the exercise of the federal
power must clearly appear. . . . [If] the Commission undertakes to prescribe a state-wide level of intrastate rates in
order to avoid an undue burden, from a revenue standpoint, upon the interstate carrier, there should be appropriate
findings upon evidence.”)
81
See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531-32, 1535 (2006);
Metzger, supra note , at 2056-57.
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the principles of federalism established by the Framers guide the executive departments and
agencies in the formulation and implementation of policies” through executive orders.82 The
latest example of such federalism concerns is President Obama’s recent memorandum imposing
limits on when agencies can act to preempt state laws.83 Yet these statutory and regulatory
demands that agencies consider constitutional values are not limited to federalism principles;
they also surface in conjunction with individual rights. A notable example involves limitations
on federal funds. A number of agencies have developed regulations to implement statutory
prohibitions on federal funds being used in racially discriminatory or otherwise unconstitutional
fashion.84 A contemporary instance is OMB’s guidance on the use of federal stimulus funds,
which provides that agencies must ensure grant recipients comply with federal antidiscrimination
statutes and program requirements.85
A second point worth noting is simply the reality that administrative constitutionalism
occurs, sometimes even in the face of hostile judicial review. This point is most frequently made
in regard to the work of the Office of Legal Counsel and the Solicitor General, whose official
responsibilities include analyzing constitutional issues arising in proposed legislation, agency
actions, and litigation.86 But though these agencies are no doubt the most attuned to
constitutional issues, they are not the sole location for constitutional interpretation within the
executive branch. Scholars are beginning to document a number of instances in which other
administrative agencies were at the forefront of developing new understandings of constitutional
rights. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, for example, have described how officials at the
EEOC developed the view that pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination.87 Sophia Lee
has offered an account of the role that constitutional arguments played in the emergence of
licensee equal employment and nondiscrimination requirements at the FCC and other federal
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Exec. Order No. 13,132 (preamble), 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601. Executive Order
13,132 replaced an earlier executive order, promulgated by President Reagan in 1987, which similarly sought to
ensure agencies paid attention to federalism principles and required assessment of the federalism impact of proposed
agency actions. See Exec. Order 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41685 (Oct. 26, 1987).
83
Presidential Memorandum: Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May 20, 2009).
84
See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100 (effectuating Title VI with respect to program or activity receiving financial
assistance from Department of Education); 45 C.F.R. § 80 (same, Department of Health and Human Services).
Similarly, agencies have adopted regulations to ensure equal treatment of faith based organizations. For example, in
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., the Supreme Court considered 34 CFR § 76.532(a)(1) (1992), which it
explained, “implements the Secretary of Education’s understanding of (and thus is coextensive with) the
requirements of the Establishment Clause.” 509 U.S. 1, 7 n.7 (1993). Today, many such regulations provide for
equal treatment of religious organizations. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 87.1(b) (“Religious organizations are eligible, on
the same basis as any other organization, to participate in any Department program for which they are otherwise
eligible….”). A particularly interesting example is the IRS’s interpretation of the tax code as prohibiting tax exempt
status to private schools that racially discriminated in admissions. See Olati Johnson, Bob Jones v. United States:
Race, Religion, and Congress’s Extraordinary Acquiescence (manuscript draft on file with author).
85
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies, Initial
Implementing Guidance for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Feb. 18. 2009).
86
See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54
UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1576-1601 (2007) (analyzing OLC’s role and critically assessing its approach to national
security issues under the Bush administration): Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Potential of the Constitution in
Executive Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676, 702-17, 740-41 (2005) (describing the work of OLC and the SG and their
effect on constitutional interpretation elsewhere in the executive branch); Morrison, supra note , at 1218--20
(discussing OLC’s approach to constitutional avoidance).
87
See Willian Eskridge & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes (4/6/09 draft at 9-11)
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agencies.88 Like Eskridge and Ferejohn, Lee emphasizes the extent to which “administrative
constitutionalism”—defined as “regulatory agencies’ independent interpretation and
implementation of constitutional law”—is “a recurring aspect of the modern American state.”89
Anuj Desai has traced the development of the idea of communications privacy, now an
established Fourth Amendment principle, to early decisions and practice within the post office.90
Law enforcement agencies provide further instances of administrative attention to constitutional
requirements, with a notable example being the Department of Justice’s U.S. Attorney Manual,
which mandates disclosure policies for U.S. attorney offices to ensure compliance with the
constitutional requirement that prosecutors’ disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants.91
Indeed, administrative constitutional interpretation arguably occurs whenever government
employees take actions that have potential constitutional significance—in short, all the time.92
B. The Constitutional Common Law Character of Ordinary Administrative Law
Several features of the appearances of constitutional law in administrative contexts merit
particular emphasis and support their characterization as instances of constitutional common law.
One is the largely indeterminate character of constitutional law when it surfaces. In some
instances, such as the First Amendment licensing context, constitutional demands on
administrative law are judicially specified with relative clarity. More commonly, however, the
Court invokes general constitutional norms or standards and the scope of specific constitutional
requirements remains uncertain. This indeterminacy is evident in procedural due process, given
the Mathews v. Eldridge case-by-case balancing analysis and the fact that statutory and
regulatory procedural protections often obviate the need for courts to determine the precise
contours of procedural due process in administrative contexts.93 Such indeterminacy is
especially true, however, of separation of powers and federalism principles invoked by courts or
the political branches to justify ordinary administrative law doctrines and decisions. Little doubt
exists, for example, that under existing case law courts do not violate either Article I or Article
III when they interpret ambiguous statutes, that Congress could delegate broad power to
administrative agencies to regulate major economic sectors with minimal specific guidance, or
that Congress could preempt broad swaths of state law through regulatory statutes. As a result,
doctrines such as Chevron or insistence on clear congressional authorization of broad delegations
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Sophia Z. Lee, Race Sex and Rulemaking, 1964-77: Revising Equal Protection History, Recovering
Administrative Constitutionalism (draft, get permission) at 12-63. For examples of the FCC’s attention to
constitutional concerns, see
89
Id. at 4, 5.
90
Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications
Privacy, 60 Stan. l. Rev. 553, 568-77 (2007).
91
See Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual, Title 9: Criminal Resource Manual §5.001 (2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm.; Fred C. Zacharias, The
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 721, 762-63 (2001). On the whole, however, law
enforcement agencies have been slow to adopt meaningful administrative constraints to guard against constitutional
violations. See Sklansky, supra note , at 1272-73; see also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of
Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 661-62 (1997) (noting
areas in which police guidelines have been adopted and continued resistance to such administrative approaches).
92
See David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 114
(1993).
93
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see supra TAN 24 -25.
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or of preemptive effect are hard to categorize as constitutionally mandated.94 Instead, they are
best described as constitutionally-inspired requirements that reflect these general constitutional
principles, while the exact nature of their constitutional underpinnings remains unspecified.
This indeterminate character is reinforced by the tacit quality of much constitutionalism
in administrative law. As noted above, the Court rarely discusses the constitutional
underpinnings of ordinary administrative law doctrines in any detail, and today often makes no
reference whatsoever to the constitutional dimensions of its administrative law decisions.95 Why
the Court is so reluctant to acknowledge the role played by constitutional concerns in the
development of ordinary administrative law is somewhat of a puzzle. Resistance to openly
acknowledging constitutional indeterminacy is not ultimately a plausible explanation, given the
extent to which the Court has embraced such indeterminacy in other aspects of constitutional
analysis and in its application of the constitutional canons, a point discussed further below.96 A
more likely cause is the Court’s increased resistance to independent federal court lawmaking
outside the constitutional context, a resistance also evident in the decline of implied rights of
action and curtailment of federal common law. 97 No doubt the Court’s greater insistence on
judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation is also playing a role. Administrative law
decisions are replete with references to Congress’s ability to control---and in particular reduce--the substantive and procedural requirements that govern agency action.98 From a judicial
supremacy perspective, such congressional authority is difficult to square with an understanding
of ordinary administrative law as having a constitutional component. Whatever the cause, the
effect of the Court’s refusal to openly acknowledge the role constitutional concerns play in
fashioning administrative law is to leave the scope of the constitutional core of ordinary
administrative law unclear.
An additional factor that obscures the boundaries between constitutional law and ordinary
administrative law is the occasional reciprocal nature of their relationship.
Not only do
constitutional concerns underlay much ordinary administrative law, but ordinary administrative
schemes and requirements in turn can inform judicial understandings of what the Constitution
requires. Under Matthews balancing, procedural due process analysis puts a thumb on the scale
in favor of existing procedures being deemed constitutionally sufficient by framing the inquiry as
94

See Barron & Kagan, supra note , at 215; Merrill & Hickman, supra note , at 866-67, 915; Metzger, supra
note , at 2048-52. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the Chevron doctrine is in fact constitutionally suspect.
See Farina, supra note , at 487-98 (arguing that Chevron deference in fact raises separation of powers concerns and
is at odds with history of delegation doctrine); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative
State; Reconciling Doctrines of Delegation with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (arguing
that Chevron deference undermines the structural constitutional role originally assigned to the judiciary).
95
See supra TAN 34-35.
96
See infra TAN 139-146.
97
See TAN 9-11; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (limiting implied right of action); Semtek
Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (applying federal common law, but finding claim
preclusion “classic case for adopting, as the federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by
state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits); see also Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal
Common Law, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 895, 899 (1996) (arguing that Supreme Court has restricted federal common
lawmaking power by “holding that state law rather than federal common law governs certain issues that federal
common law would have governed under prior case law” and by “requiring federal courts to incorporate state law
rules as federal law even when federal common law does govern a particular issue or case.”).
98
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523-24, 548
(1976); see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-603 (1988) (noting Congress’s ability to preclude judicial
review),
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the extent to which additional procedures would add to the accuracy of agency determinations.99
Similarly, an administrative complaint mechanism can offer very different relief from that
available under Bivens—and in particular, no opportunity for money damages—and yet suffice
for the Court to conclude that an individual’s constitutional rights are satisfied.100 Alternatively,
in some cases the Court may use existing administrative requirements to define the content of
constitutional requirements. Of particular relevance here is Miranda: the constitutional warnings
there required by the Court were not its own independent creation, but instead were the
procedures the FBI had devised to ensure that confessions were not coerced.101 Another example
emerges from the context of institutional reform litigation, in which successful programmatic
initiatives become identified as remedies for constitutional violations through their incorporation
in consent decrees.102 More generally, the Solicitor General is an influential litigant at the
Supreme Court, and thus the federal government’s accounts of its administrative needs and the
impact of constitutional protections is likely to be taken seriously by the Court in setting the
boundaries of constitutional rights.103 This impact of ordinary administrative law and
administrative practice in setting the scope of constitutional requirements is of a piece with the
numerous ways in which constitutional law has bent and transformed in response to the
institutional and regulatory needs of the modern administrative state.104
A final feature of note is the evolving nature of ordinary administrative law, particularly
administrative law as applied by the courts.105 Despite occasional efforts by the Court and
99

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, (1976). While the Court has insisted that legislatively provided
procedures cannot be the measure of all the process that is due, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, (1985), this analytic framing of the inquiry takes the government’s provided procedures as the baseline against
which additional requirements must be justified, rather than a more independent judicial assessment of what types of
procedures are appropriate given the interests involved.
100
For a recent example, see Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, where the Court noted that the inmates
in question had the alternative of pursuing “injunctive relief and grievances filed through the [Bureau of Prisons’]
Administrative Remedy Program (ARP).” 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001). For a discussion of two earlier cases, Schweiker
v. Chilicky and Bush v. Lucas, see supra note 28
101
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483--86 (1966) (citing letter from FBI describing Bureau
practice of issuing warning at beginning of interview, including “right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that
any statement [suspect or person under arrest] does make may be used against him in court” as well as “right to free
counsel”); see also Sheldon H. Elsen & Arthur Rosett, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 645, 653 (1967) (arguing that FBI practice
actually differed with respect to right to counsel during interrogations, and that “FBI experience merited deeper
probing than it received” from the Court).
102
See David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform,
51 UCLA L Rev. 1015, 1047-62 (2004) (identifying housing and prison litigation as two instances in which this
phenomenon has occurred): see also Charles A. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1016 -52 (2004) (arguing that experimentalist administrative
methods, in particular benchmarking, performance measurement, and monitoring, are increasingly being required in
consent degrees as mechanisms for remedying constitutional violations).
103
See Pillard, supra note , at 689.
104
Numerous examples exist, including the rejection of meaningful limits on congressional delegations,
acceptance of administrative agencies combining legislative, executive, and adjudicatory powers and novel
structures, and massive expansion in the scope of federal regulatory authority. For a critical account, see Gary
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231 (2007); compare Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 579
(1984) (arguing that modern administrative agencies are compatible with constitutional principles). Such accession
to administrative imperatives is also evident in regard to individual rights, as for instance in the acceptance of lower
Fourth Amendment protections in administrative contexts, see Marshall v. Barlow, 436 U.S. 307, 313-14, 320-21
(1978) (noting the closely regulated exception to the warrant requirement and emphasizing lower standard for
establishing probable cause even in other contexts).
105
The executive branch’s approach to administrative law has also changed markedly over the years, most
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commentators to posit a static and statutorily-based account of administrative law,106 any such
account fails to capture much of current administrative law doctrine. Instead, a dominant feature
of ordinary administrative law is its common-law, evolving character.107 This evolving character
is especially evident in regard to the standards and availability of judicial review under the APA.
The Court not only has intensified arbitrary and capricious review over time and further refined
its Chevron doctrine, it has also dramatically expanded the range of persons who could challenge
agency action. Moreover, the Court’s rules with respect to timing and preclusion of judicial
review are overwhelmingly common-law derived, rather than statutorily-determined, and as a
result have also developed over time.108 This evolutionary process is equally apparent with
respect to the APA’s procedural requirements for informal rulemaking, with current
requirements of notice and agency response to comments far exceeding what the text of the APA
suggests was originally expected.109
Constitutional concerns with unchecked agency power underlay all these judicial
developments.110 Expanded rulemaking procedures and greater court access, along with
heightened substantive scrutiny, helped guard against otherwise unaccountable agency abuses of
delegated power.111 But tying the evolution of ordinary administrative law solely to
constitutional concerns and judicial development ignores the degree to which this evolution is
also politically driven. Statutes like the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)112 and government
notably with the advent of Executive Order 12,866 and regulatory review, but for purposes of connecting to
discussions of constitutional common law my focus here is more on the evolving cast of judicial doctrine.
106
See Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272
(1994) (arguing that the APA must be interpreted according to its original meaning when adopted in 1946); Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 523-24 (1976) (arguing that courts lack power to impose
procedural requirements not required by the APA, other statutes or regulations, or the Constitution); see also John
Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 113 (1998) (acknowledging the common
law character of much of administrative law but arguing that administrative law is becoming increasingly statutory
and praising this development).
107
See Jack M. Beerman, Common Law and Statute Law in U.S. Federal Administrative Law, in Linda
Pearson et al. eds, Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in Honor of Mark Aronson 45,45-47 (2008);
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 3, 3-10.
108
See Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 172356 (1975); see also Merrill, supra note , at 1039-44, 1074-83 (tracing expansion and subsequent contraction in
doctrines affecting the availability of judicial review).
109
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (requiring mere “description of the subject and issues involved” and “concise
general statement of [a rule’s] basis and purpose” will suffice); Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F. 3d 227,
245-47 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh J., concurring and dissenting in part); Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson,
Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 856, 882-900 (2007) (arguing that a number of current
rulemaking requirements go beyond § 553's text).
110
See supra TAN 31-34.
111
See Stewart, supra note , at 1711-60 (analyzing changes as representing a transformation in judicial
review to focus on ensuring that all affected interests are fairly represented and considered by administrative
agencies). Courts emphasized the connection between enhanced notice and participation requirements and checks
on agency decisonmaking, see, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530-31 (1982); U.S. v. Nova
Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-53 (2d Cir. 1977), as well as at times invoked seemingly due processbased concerns of fundamental fairness, see, e.g., PGBC [2nd cir]. Although express invocations of fundamental
fairness in the rulemaking context have not faired well at the Court, see Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655-56 (1990); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 541-43 (1978),
the Court has made little effort to curb § 553's expansion. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S.
158, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2351 (2007) (accepting the logical outgrowth rule and its emphasis on “fair notice”); Metzger,
supra note , at 161-62.
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Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
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in the sunshine requirements113 embodied new political demands for open government that may
have catalyzed judicial procedural developments.114 Similarly, the norm of expert, informed
decisionmaking embodied in the reasoned explanation requirement traces back to creation of the
civil service and protections for administrative independence from politics in the formative
period of the national administrative state.115 Over the years this norm has been reinforced by a
vast array of other measures—prime among them the APA, but also substantive statutory
provisions that demand a scientific basis for regulations and or provisions creating agency
structures that give prominent role to professionals and substantive expertise.116 Agencies also
often voluntarily adopt regulatory requirements that limit their discretion and expand procedural
protections.117 These statutory and regulatory enactments sometimes reflect the political
branches’ understandings of what the Constitution demands. But they are more clearly
“constitutional” in the sense of embodying basic contemporary normative commitments with
respect to how government should operate.118
The net result of these features is that a good deal of ordinary administrative law could be
characterized as constitutional common law. As Monaghan defined it, constitutional common
law has two core components: the specification of requirements that are not themselves
constitutionally mandated but serve to implement constitutional demands; and a role for the
Ordinary
political branches in specifying the shape that these requirements take.119
administrative law reflects the same characteristics. Its doctrines are constitutionally rooted but
not constitutionally required, and emerge over time in a reciprocally informing fashion. Most
significantly, Congress enjoys extensive power to control the contours of ordinary administrative
law notwithstanding its constitutional dimensions.120 To be sure, there may be limits to such
113

See, e.g, Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976), codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§552b, 557(d); Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. II §§ 1-15).
114
See Peter L. Strauss, Statutes that Are Not Static, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 767, 788-90, 796-99
(2005) (arguing that FOIA provided statutory support for judicial expansion of APA requirements, and noting that
Congress also enacted other, statute-specific hybrid procedures).
115
See Stephen Skowronek, Building a New Administrative State; The Expansion of
Nationa1Adminsitrative Capacities, 1877-1920 at 78-210 (1982) (describing progressive emphasis on expertise and
opposition to the spoils system, and gradual expansion of merit-based civil service)
116
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-09 (requiring that the EPA promulgate national air quality standards based
on criteria that reflect latest scientific knowledge);21 C.F.R. §§ 14.100, 14.80 (listing standing advisory committees
at the FDA and qualifications for membership).
117
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 Administrative Law Treatise §7.10 at 504 (noting that many agencies
have issued rules obliging them to use notice-and-comment rulemaking for “matters involving public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts,” despite the APA’s exemption of these matters from rulemaking requirements);
Food & Drug Administration’s Development, Issuance and Use of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961 (Feb.
27, 1997), subsequently adopted and amended by Congress in the Food and Drug Administration Accountability and
Modernization Act, at 21 U.S.C. § 371(h); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 891 (2009) (noting that most agencies follow the APA’s
separation of functions requirements whenever imposing punishment, even if not required by terms of the APA).
118
They are thus arguably examples of what Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn call small-c
constitutional law, or what Ernest Young recently described as the constitution outside the Constitution. See
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note , at 7-33; Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale
L.J. 408, 411-14, 447 (2007);see also Tom Ginsburg, On the Constitutional Character of Administrative Law, Draft,
at *2--*3 (May 7, 2009) at http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/conference.htm ()
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See Monaghan, supra note , at 2-3.
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The president and administrative agencies themselves also play an important role, but their participation
is in the form of adding additional constraints rather than reducing statutory requirements. Elizabeth Magill,
Foreword: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859 (2009).
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congressional authority; efforts by Congress to exempt agencies wholesale from duties of
explanation or to preclude judicial review of broad swaths of agency action would likely face
judicial resistance.121 But those are general systemic constraints that leave Congress broad
discretion to reshape ordinary administrative law in particular contexts.122 Moreover, Congress
has shown little interest in diluting ordinary administrative law in such an across-the-board
fashion, and at times added new constraints.123 Indeed, recently the political branches have been
more overt than the courts in their efforts to use administrative law to address constitutional
concerns.
II. Implications of the Constitutional Character of Ordinary Administrative Law
Recognizing the linkages between ordinary administrative law and constitutional law has
several important implications for the debate over constitutional common law. Critiques of
constitutional common law are often premised on the assumption that a clear divide exists
between ordinary law and constitutional law, but as a descriptive matter, that divide does not
exist in the administrative law context. Perhaps more importantly, as a normative matter the
constitutional common law status of ordinary administrative law has much to commend it. The
real weakness in the Court’s jurisprudence is not its intermixing of constitutional law and
ordinary administrative law, but rather its failure to embrace judicially-enforced administrative
constitutionalism more thoroughly and overtly.
A.

The False Divide Between Constitutional and Nonconstitutional Law

Constitutional common law has long been attacked as illegitimate. One prominent line of
criticism argues that constitutional common law violates basic separation of powers and
federalism principles of our constitutional system, which combine to limit the federal courts’
independent lawmaking role.124 As the Court famously put the point in Erie Railroad Company
v. Tompkins, “[t]here is no federal general common law.”125 Of course, the Erie principle has not
121

See Murphy, supra note, at 1127, 1132-34 (suggesting that “elimination [of hard look review] would
affect how courts interpret other means of judicial control which are rooted in the Constitution,” in particular
nondelegation doctrine”).
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Cf Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies,
104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1778-79, 1787-91 (1991) (arguing that while “the aspiration to effective individual
remediation for every constitutional violation represents an important remedial principle,” Congress may
constitutionally deviate from that goal provided it supplies “a system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep
government generally within the bounds of law”).
123
See 29 U.S.C. §655 (2006) (outlining procedure by which occupational health and safety standards are
set, including provision by which, inter alia, interested persons can request an oral hearing and standards must be
justified by substantial evidence); supra TAN 112-114 (discussing FOIA and open government requirements added
in the 1970s). That said, Congress has sought to reduce judicial review of administrative actions in particular
contexts, immigration being a central one. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2).
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Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80
Nw. U. L. Rev. 100, 123-29 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 13-27 (1985); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering The Constitutional Common Law, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 1117, 1126-315 (1978); see also Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1248-49, 1256-64, 1269-71 (1996) (outlining the constitutional argument
against “open-ended federal common lawmaking by courts”).
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governed in anything near such absolute form, with the Court sanctioning development of federal
common law in several contexts.126 Yet the Court has increasingly emphasized that such
exceptions are “few and restricted, limited to situations where there is a significant conflict
between some federal policy interest and the use of state law”127 and all subject to congressional
override.128 Hence, as a general matter courts can displace federal and state law only in the
course of enforcing either the Constitution or some other binding federal enactment. In the case
of constitutional common law, however, the constitutional rule applied by the courts is by
definition provisional and subject to congressional revision, yet is used to trump state law. Some
critics deny that the federal courts have the authority to impose a constitutional rule that is not
actually constitutionally required.129
Constitutional common law has not lacked for defenders.130 Some scholars have sought
to salvage at least portions of constitutional common law by arguing that the rules imposed
actually are constitutionally required unless Congress imposes an adequate substitute “that
provides roughly the same degree of protection for constitutional policies as the federal common
law rule.”131 A number of others have insisted that institutional competency concerns, such as
limits on the courts’ ability to identify constitutional violations and enforce amorphous tests, are
legitimate factors for the courts to consider and inevitably result in constitutional doctrines that
differ in scope from the constitutional provisions they enforce.132 Sometimes the resultant
doctrines are prophylactic and prohibit actions the Constitution might seem to allow; at other
times, institutional concerns lead to underenforcement of constitutional requirements.133
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See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1941); see also Richard Fallon
et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 685 (6th ed. 2009) (“There is no longer
serious dispute that the body of federal law legitimately includes judge-made law—law that cannot be fairly
described as simply applying federal statutory or constitutional enactments, and that is subject to legislative
override.”).
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O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
128
See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Trans. Workers U, 451 U.S. 77, 95 & n.34 (1981).
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Grano, supra , at 134; see also Merrill, supra note , at 54-56 (“[A] body of common law rules “inspired”
but not “required” by the Constitution presents far more serious problems of legitimacy than Monaghan
acknowledges.”); Schrock & Welsh, supra note , at 1131-45. A second line of criticism also leveled at constitutional
common law is that the approach was insufficiently protective of constitutional rights, particularly by allowing
Congress to revise judicial rules implementing constitutional requirements and encouraging the Court itself to
interpret constitutional requirements minimally so as to leave room for experimentation. See Schrock & Welsh,
supra note , at 1152-53, 1158-71.
130
Monaghan, of course, was one of these. His justifications for constitutional common law were largely
pragmatic, emphasizing the benefits of the concept as “a satisfactory way to rationalize a large and steadily growing
body of Court decisions,” the Court’s special institutional competence in fashioning understandings of the content of
constitutional rights, and “the need for a national definition at least the significant dimensions” of constitutional
liberties. Monaghan, supra note , at 19, 35-36. But he also justified it on grounds of constitutional principle,
arguing that the possibility of congressional revision and dialogue addressed separation of powers and federalism
concerns and underscoring that “constitutionally inspired common law is . . . designed to effectuate policies found in
the text and structure of the Constitution.” Id. at 35.
131
Merrill, supra , at 58; Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000
Sup. Ct. Rev. 61, 76-85 (2000); see also Grano, supra note , 119-22, 130-32, (arguing that some of Monaghan’s
examples of constitutional common law are actually mandatory constitutional rules).
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See, e.g., Richard Fallon, Implementing the Constitution 5–8, 37-41 (2001); Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 8-10, 92-99 (2004); Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1652-67; David A.
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 194-95, 207-08 (1988).
133
See Strauss, supra note , at 195-207; see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. l. Rev. 1212, 1214-21, 1227 (1978) (arguing that some constitutional
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This debate has played out most recently with respect to the constitutional canons of
statutory interpretation. On the surface, this statutory interpretation context might seem quite
different from Monaghan-style constitutional common law, which is avowedly constitutional in
its focus. But although arising in statutory interpretation contexts, the canons in fact represent a
form of constitutional enforcement. Under the canons, the Court seeks to protect constitutional
values through means such as presumptions, clear statement rules, and construing statutes to
avoid constitutional doubts.134 Moreover, the parallel goes deeper, because implicit in the
Court’s application of the canons and efforts to address constitutional concerns through statutory
interpretation is recognition that these efforts are subject to congressional revision, with
Congress retaining power to overturn the Court’s constitutionally-inspired interpretations.135
Hence, the canons constitute another example of constitutional common law—constitutional or
constitutionally-inspired determinations that, while binding, are avowedly provisional in
nature.136 Not surprisingly therefore, some have criticized use of the canons as an illegitimate
form of covert constitutional decisionmaking by which courts restrict Congress and rewrite
statutes based on amorphous constitutional concerns as opposed to actual constitutional
violations.137 In turn, defenders of the canons have invoked arguments akin to those raised to
justify constitutional common law, in particular maintaining that the canons are no different in
principle from much constitutional law and represent doctrinal mechanisms for enforcing
constitutional norms that, due to limitations on the courts’ institutional competency, are not
easily imposed by courts directly.138
Underlying many of these attacks on constitutional common law---whether launched
earlier at Monaghan’s defense of constitutional common law or more recently at the Court’s
norms are judicially underenforced for institutional competency reasons but remain fully binding on other
government officials).
134
See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1548, 1585 (2000); see also Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting
Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wm 7 Mary L. Rev. 1575, 1582-94,
1735-55 (2001) (describing a number of constitutional “second look” doctrines that emphasize the process Congress
uses in reaching decisions and reflect a collaborative approach to constitutional interpretation, and including
constitutional common law and the constitutional canons as examples); Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene
(McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early
Warren Court, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 397, 450--52 (2005) (arguing canon of constitutional avoidance is “is a rule of
constitutional adjudication”); Morrison, supra note ?, at 1212 (“[T]he overarching norm implemented by the
avoidance canon is that if Congress wants to legislate to the limits of its constitutional authority or in a manner that
otherwise raises serious constitutional concerns, it mes be clear about its intent to do so.”).
135
See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005) (“The canon [of constitutional avoidance] is … a
means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it”).
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See Manning [this volume]; see also Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible
“Semisubstantive” Constitutional Rules, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2835, 2843--44 (2009) (describing “clear statement”
rule as “constitutional ‘how’ rule,” whose substantive holding is subject to congressional revision); William N.
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992) (categorizing the canons as a form of quasi-constitutional law); Mark Tushnet,
Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1871, 1871 & n3
(2001) (terming them subconstitutionalism).
137
See Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 285 (1985); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander
Revisted, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 86-89 (1995); see also William K. Kelly, Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A
Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L Rev. 831, 860-64, 867-91 (2000) (noting concerns about constitutional
penumbras voiced by Posner and Schauer and arguing that the canons also illegitimately intrude on the President’s
Article II take care power).
138
See Young, supra note , at 1585-87, 1591-93, 1603-06; Sunstein, supra note , at 337-42.
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expanded use of the constitutional canons---is a vision of the Constitution as having determinate
limits as well as a binary, on/off character.139 Governmental action either violates constitutional
requirements or it does not; a judicially-imposed requirement either is constitutionally mandatory
or it is not.140
Wholly excluded is the possibility that no such clear divide between
constitutional law and nonconstitutional law exists, that a given governmental action could
implicate constitutional values in a way meriting judicial response yet not be a sufficient basis
for a court to hold the action unconstitutional or to preclude congressional revision of judicial
determinations.141 Ernest Young articulated this alternative vision in his defense of the
constitutional canons, in which he rejected the binary model and argued instead that some
constitutional requirements surface as “resistance norms” that “are best enforced through
doctrinal tools in the context of statutory construction.”142
The critics’ view of constitutional law as having determinate limits and a binary character
is descriptively false when it comes to administrative law.143 Far more accurate is Professor
Young’s resistance norms model, with general constitutional values and principles being
enforced through nonconstitutional mechanisms such as statutory construction and
administrative policysetting. As noted above, constitutional law frequently surfaces in ordinary
administrative law in a highly indeterminate form; constitutional concerns shape administrative
law doctrines and lie in the background of numerous administrative enactments, but often the
precise scope of the constitutional requirements involved remains opaque.144
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To some extent, Monaghan himself also accepted a distinction between constitutional and
nonconstitutional law, distinguishing constitutional common law from, on the one hand, more pure Marbury-style
constitutional interpretation and on the other ordinary federal common law. See Monaghan, supra note , at 30--34
(distinguishing Marbury style review); id. at 11--13 (describing standard technique of deriving federal common
law). Yet in setting out in essence a tripartite framework—constitutional interpretation, constitutional common law,
and nonconstitutional law, including federal common law––and in acknowledging that the distinction between
constitutional interpretation and constitutional common law was a matter of degree, see Monaghan, supra note , at
31, Monaghan resisted the insistence on a clear constitutional/nonconstitutional demarcation.
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For recent articulations of this constitutional vision, see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454
(Scalia, J., dissenting); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation,
122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003 (2009).
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Young, supra note , at 1593-94. Interestingly, many defenses of constitutional common law evidence a
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e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1655-58, 1670 (arguing that constitutional decision rules may deviate
substantiallyfrom the operative meaning of the Constitution, but are nonetheless legitimate); Dorf & Friedman,
supra note , at 78-80 (attempting to reconcile Miranda’s constitutional status with its acceptance of alternative
safeguards by reading Miranda’s holding narrowly and emphasizing the legitimacy of shared constitutional
interpretation); Strauss, supra note , at 195-207 (arguing that judicially-imposed prophylactic rules are ubiquitous in
constitutional law, rather than questioning the assumption that they must be fully constitutional to be legitimate)
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Young, supra note , at 1593-94. Young also rejects the assumption that statutory interpretation should
be “constitution-free,” Schauer, supra note , at 83. arguing that “[s]uch an approach excludes a source of statutory
meaning which is no less legitimate than other principles and policies which frequently enter into interpretation.”
Young, supra , at 1591-92. Other scholars have similarly concluded that statutory interpretation is inseparable form
constitutional law. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes,
32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 827, 839 (1990) (arguing that all methodological commitments regarding statutory
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See also TAN 59-61.
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The indeterminancy of constitutional considerations in administrative settings is hardly
unique. It is a commonplace that numerous core constitutional demands—due process, equal
protection, freedom of speech—are broad enough to support a wide array of meanings.145 More
importantly, constitutional adjudication is characterized by frequent resort to general
constitutional values and principles. This is particularly true of separation of powers and
federalism analyses, which are often driven more by general structural constitutional norms than
by specific constitutional requirements.146 General values also feature in individual rights
contexts, with the Court balancing countervailing constitutional concerns in defining the scope of
constitutional protections.147 Indeed, constitutional common law is sometimes defended as a
mechanism for vindicating general constitutional values and polices. As Daniel Meltzer
commented: “If federal courts have authority to formulate common law rules to help implement
the broad purposes of statutory enactments, why should the same not be true when the source of
inspiration is a set of values in the Constitution?”148
In the administrative law context, indeterminacy surfaces not just in establishing what the
Constitution requires, but also in specifying when constitutional requirements end and
nonconstitutional administrative law begins. A central feature of ordinary administrative law is
the absence of a clear divide between its constitutional and nonconstitutional aspects. To be
sure, many ordinary administrative law requirements are clearly constitutional or statutory and
regulatory in nature. But what is striking is how many core doctrines and administrative
requirements are simultaneously constitutional and nonconstitutional, and these dimensions are
too overlapping and interactive to be easily segregated. It is impossible to know, for example,
how arbitrary and capriciousness scrutiny would have developed absent constitutional concerns
with unchecked agency power that helped (openly at first, and more tacitly later) fuel
145

See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Forward: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 58
(1997) (“[R]easonable citizens, lawyers, and judges differ widely about what methodology should be used to
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Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 98, 104–05 (2009) (describing structural reasoning in
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attempting to perform their important public functions”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999)
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legitimate governmental interests”; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875--79 (1992)
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life] with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty”).
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Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1173 (1986); see
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development of current hard look review. It is equally impossible to know what shape
constitutional delegation doctrine or rationality review of administrative actions would have
taken were the APA not available to courts as a surrogate for addressing these constitutional
concerns. As noted above, the availability of such ordinary administrative law constraints--particularly ordinary administrative law constraints that it shaped to address tacit constitutional
concerns---has allowed the Court to avoid addressing these constitutional issues directly.149
Ordinary administrative law thus challenges the image of constitutional law as
substantially determinate as well as the closely associated assumption that a clear divide exists
between constitutional and nonconstitutional law. This descriptive point carries normative
implications. To begin with, it suggests that the critique of constitutional common law is based
on an image of constitutional law that differs from how constitutional law actually operates.
Constitutional law does not only surface in clearly demarcated contexts, but instead seeps into
other areas of law, often operating in the background to shape development of non-constitutional
legal requirements.
Further, the implications of adopting a narrow and determinate vision of constitutional
law could not be limited to the sphere of constitutional adjudication; instead, broad areas of what
are assumed to be nonconstitutional law would also be significantly affected. Even if
conceptually possible, segregating out constitutional considerations from ordinary administrative
law would be extremely disruptive of current practice. It would force courts to reconsider
existing well-established doctrines that appear to exceed their supposed statutory basis, and
potentially to address constitutional questions that they have been able avoid through reliance on
ordinary administrative law. Worse, because of this reliance, courts may face a gap in
constitutional doctrine that they would need to overcome, limiting their ability to proceed
incrementally and with flexibility.150 Moreover, any such effort at segregation would effectively
end the common law method of fashioning administrative law doctrine; it is hard to see how a
principled distinction can be drawn between ordinary administrative common law and
constitutional common law, as the same issue of independent judicial lawmaking is presented in
both.151 In any event, as a practical matter, constitutional concerns will likely creep back into
administrative law doctrines unless the use of the common law method is more broadly curtailed.
In short, rejecting constitutional common law would force a dramatic change in the practice and
doctrines of ordinary administrative law.
B.

Justifying Administrative Constitutionalism

The case for preserving the constitutional common law character of administrative law
goes well beyond avoiding disruption, however. My focus here will be on justifying judicial
efforts to encourage administrative constitutionalism, and more specifically on using ordinary
administrative law to force agencies to take constitutional values seriously in their
decisionmaking. Under such an approach, courts would require agencies to expressly address
serious constitutional concerns raised by their actions. Agencies failing to do so would face
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potential remand of their decisions as arbitrary and capricious, or alternatively a loss of
deference on the grounds that their statutory interpretations were unreasonable.152
The reasons to focus on this particular intersection between administrative law and
constitutional law are twofold. First, it is the least accepted incorporation of constitutional
concerns into administrative law. Although some have questioned whether particular measures,
such as the Miranda rules, can be legitimately derived from the Constitution, the general
proposition that governments may be required to adopt some administrative mechanisms to meet
constitutional demands is not disputed.153 Similarly, federal court reliance when possible on
ordinary administrative law in lieu of constitutional law is simply a manifestation of the rule that
courts should reach constitutional questions only as a last resort, a deeply embedded and largely
accepted judicial technique.154 Judicial development of ordinary administrative law doctrines to
address constitutional concerns is more contentious,155 but it too has received judicial sanction in
the past and at least is not overtly condemned.156 This approach is also closely akin to
application of the constitutional avoidance canon, particularly when it manifests in judicial
interpretation of administrative law statutes, and thus is not analytically that unusual. Indeed,
the Court’s use of constitutional avoidance remains a vibrant part of its approach to statutory
interpretation.157 In comparison, as demonstrated by Fox, the Court remains quite reluctant to
use ordinary administrative law as a mechanism to encourage administrative constitutionalism.
In addition, judicially-enforced administrative constitutionalism stands out in its
emphasis on shared constitutional implementation. Along with constitutional indeterminacy, this
is the other key characteristic of constitutional common law. Use of administrative measures to
satisfy constitutional requirements, by contrast, is more in keeping with Marbury-style
constitutional adjudication; involvement of Congress and agencies in determining what
constitutes constitutionally-adequate measures is possible, but not necessary. Injection of
constitutional concerns into administrative law doctrines has strands of shared constitutional
interpretation, as congressional enactments could trump many judicially developed
administrative law requirements and the political branches have certainly imposed requirements
on agencies that reflect constitutional concerns. Yet the invitation to engage in interbranch
constitutional interpretation is much clearer when ordinary administrative law is used to force
152
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agencies to take constitutional values into account in their decisionmaking. Development of
administrative law doctrine to address constitutional concerns, by contrast, has been largely a
judicial endeavor.
Despite its condemnation in Fox and general lack of overt employment by the Court, the
use of ordinary administrative law to encourage administrative constitutional deliberation has
much to commend it. This approach accords well with the administrative character of
contemporary federal government and basic structural principles underlying our constitutional
system, while at the same time ensuring effective constitutional enforcement and interfering less
with political branch prerogatives than more direct judicial constitutional enforcement.
1. Administrative governance and administrative constitutionalism. Perhaps the
strongest argument for requiring agencies to take account of constitutional concerns in their
decisionmaking is that doing so acknowledges the reality of modern administrative governance.
Administrative agencies are today the primary decisionmakers in federal government. To be
sure, agency actions are governed by the terms of authorizing statutes and they act subject to at
times substantial congressional and presidential oversight. But these controls do not alter the
reality that agencies wield considerable independent discretion in setting the shape of national
policy and implementing federal programs.
As those primarily responsible for setting governmental policy, agencies should have an
obligation to take constitutional norms and requirements seriously in their decisionmaking. Such
an obligation can be inferred simply from the structure of our constitutional order, under which
the Constitution governs all exercises of governmental authority and all governmental officials
have an independent duty to support it.158 It could also be seen as a condition of delegation. The
Court has made clear that broad congressional delegations of authority to administrative agencies
are constitutional, but it has failed to adequately consider whether such delegations should come
with constitutional strings attached.159 One such string should be that congressional delegations
not serve to remove constitutional constraints that would otherwise apply.160 Hence, if Congress
has an independent and to some degree judicially enforceable obligation to take constitutional
norms and values into account, as it does under the constitutional canons and other “second look
doctrines,” then the constitutional price of delegation should be that congressional delegates face
this obligation too.161
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One critical difference between Congress and agencies is that agencies lack independent
constitutional lawmaking authority and can only exercise those powers delegated to them by
Congress.162 This basic proposition underlies the well-established rule that a court will set aside
an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider.”163 Preserving congressional legislative supremacy
thus entails that courts not require agencies to consider constitutional concerns when Congress
has expressly or impliedly excluded such factors from agency deliberations. But the instances in
which consideration of constitutional concerns is incompatible with a congressional regulatory
scheme will be rare. More common will be occasions in which taking constitutional values into
account will change the shape of federal regulation and perhaps make it somewhat less effective
in achieving congressional regulatory goals. In such contexts, agency consideration of
constitutional values absent congressional instruction to the contrary should still be legitimate.
Congress might well accept a trade-off of regulatory effectiveness for greater protection of
constitutional values, At any rate, the assumption that Congress would do so seems little
different from the assumption of congressional constitutional sensitivity that underlies judicial
application of the canons.164 More importantly, given the central role of the Constitution in our
governmental structure, unless Congress indicates to the contrary, the default presumption
should be that Congress intends administrative agencies to consider constitutional values in their
decisionmaking..165
Requiring that agencies consider the constitutional implications of their actions is far
from the radical proposition Fox made it seem. Few deny that agencies—like all who exercise
governmental power—have a legally enforceable duty to avoid violating the Constitution. True,
the Fox Court sought to distinguish between this duty and an obligation to consider constitutional
norms and principles more generally. Yet such a distinction is impossible to maintain in
practice. Agencies must take constitutional norms and principles into account even to avoid
actual constitutional violations, as they will often face situations in which the import of
precedent and existing constitutional requirements is unclear. Moreover, it is at least arguable
that “[t]he executive branch’s independent obligation to enforce the Constitution” may “entail
enforcing [some constitutional] norm[s] more robustly than the courts would.”166
The real dispute in Fox is instead over whether agencies’ obligation to consider
constitutional concerns should be enforceable by courts under ordinary administrative law. Such
judicial enforcement is not logically required by the proposition that agencies have an obligation
to take constitutional concerns into account. Indeed, on a departmentalist approach that
emphasizes each branch’s independent responsibilities to interpret the Constitution, judicial
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enforcement might in fact seem an illegitimate extension of the courts’ role.167 But this
complaint ignores the special position of agencies. “[A]n agency is neither Congress nor
President nor Court, but an inferior part of government. Each agency is subject to control
relationships with some or all of the three constitutionally named branches, and those
relationships give an assurance . . . that they will not pass out of control.”168 Whereas judicial
imposition of duties of deliberation on Congress and the President raise concerns of unwarranted
judicial intrusion into the workings of constitutionally coequal branches, judicial supervision of
administrative decisionmaking has long been thought pivotal for ensuring the constitutional
legitimacy of administrative action.169
Thus, just as judicial review ensures that agencies adhere to congressional will and do not
exceed or ignore statutory requirements, so too judicial review should ensure that agencies fulfill
their constitutional obligations. Importantly, judicial enforcement is only one route by which
such policing of agencies’ constitutional deliberations occurs; as discussed above, Congress and
the President have been quite active in instructing agencies to give weight to constitutional
concerns.170 It is hard to see why judicial encouragement of administrative constitutionalism
should be more suspect than similar efforts by the political branches---especially given the
courts’ traditional role as constitutional enforcers.
That leaves the question of whether courts should enforce agencies’ obligation to
consider constitutional concerns through the medium of ordinary administrative law as opposed
to direct constitutional scrutiny. Using ordinary administrative law for this purpose has several
advantages. To begin with, it underscores the argument that judicial review of agencies’
constitutional deliberations should not be thought unusual. In addition, this approach better
accommodates the various factors, constitutional and nonconstitutional, that agencies must take
into account in setting policy. Agencies cannot deliberate about constitutional concerns in a
vacuum; instead, they must assess how to take these concerns into account while satisfying their
statutory responsibilities and presidential policy priorities.171 Using ordinary administrative law
further reinforces the point that what is demanded is consideration of constitutional values, not
that these values necessarily trump other concerns, and that the consideration of the relevant
values be done by agencies in the first instance. As a result, under ordinary administrative law
principles a careful explanation of how constitutional concerns were accommodated or why
constitutional concerns are outweighed is all that an agency must supply. It then becomes the
courts’ responsibility to determine whether the agency’s decision accords with constitutional
requirements, assuming a constitutional challenge is also brought.
2. Ensuring adequate constitutional enforcement. The continued availability of
independent constitutional scrutiny merits emphasis. Such scrutiny ensures that reliance on
167
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ordinary administrative review does not undermine judicial constitutional enforcement. Even if
an agency reasonably opts to pursue a particular policy despite constitutional concerns, and
hence satisfies the demands of ordinary administrative review, a court may still invalidate the
policy as actually unconstitutional.172 Thus, skepticism that the executive branch will elevate its
political agenda over constitutional considerations should not fuel opposition to the ordinary
administrative law approach advocated here.173
In fact, however, encouraging agencies to take constitutional concerns into account is
likely to prove a valuable mechanism for ensuring effective constitutional enforcement in
administrative contexts. Administrative consideration will be particularly important in contexts
where constitutional requirements are arguably judicially underenforced, such as federalism,
delegation limits, or governmental funding restrictions.174 In addition, constitutional challenges
frequently depend on complex factual determinations, such as the scope of the burden actually
imposed by a proposed regulation, the availability of less burdensome alternatives, and the
seriousness of the harm the government seeks to address. As Kenneth Bamberger observes,
agencies have particular competence in investigating and assessing the factual basis that often
underlies constitutional claims.175 Even if subsequent judicial scrutiny is needed to ensure that
adequate constitutional constraints are adequately enforced, that review will be enhanced by
agency development of a factual record, the type of record that agencies would need to produce
to demonstrate they had considered the constitutional claims at issue.176 Agencies also have the
capacity to devise regulatory solutions that avoid raising constitutional issues in the first
instance, whereas courts are limited to responding to regulatory choices made by others. Thus,
an agency sensitive to the due process concerns raised by indefinite detention of deportable
aliens might choose to forego such detention altogether in lieu of an alternative approach, or
decide to employ detention in only some contexts rather than across-the-board.177 To take
another recent example, an agency might decline to preempt state measures out of concern to not
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intrude unnecessarily on state authority.178 Courts might, of course, impose similar limitations
on agency authority, but some constitutional issues may not reach the courts, and at a minimum
agency restraint avoids the need for suit to ensure constitutional values are protected.179
Equally important, agencies are able to adopt and implement far-reaching reforms that
can be more effective than court-ordered relief in avoiding and remedying constitutional
problems in administrative settings. Decisionmaking by professionals within an agency and
external expert review are important checks on agency overreaching and arbitrary
determinations, but courts would not impose such personnel measures on agencies unless
required by statutes or existing agency regulations.180 Managerial reforms—such as better
training and oversight of personnel or enhanced accountability measures—are often critical in
addressing constitutional problems in institutional contexts, and are frequently judicially ordered
in the context of institutional reform litigation.181 But such reforms may be most effective when
they are developed internally than when externally imposed.182 In addition, the Court has
repeatedly signaled a reluctance to intrude upon federal agency management, insisting on
addressing only specific agency actions instead of broader attacks on federal programs.183
Although court-ordered systemic relief remains available when necessary to ensure protection of
constitutional rights, systemic and broad-scale managerial reforms are far more likely to result
from agency initiation than from judicial intervention.184

178

See Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (GET PAREN); see also President
Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Preemption (May 20, 2009)
(“[P]reemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only with full
consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal basis for preemption.”).
179
See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (finding tax payer not have
standing to sue on basis that Office of Faith-Based Initiatives violates establishment clause); David S. Strauss,
Presidential Interpretation Of The Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 115-16 (1993) (noting that “categories of
decisions, in which the issue seldom ends up in court, the executive is less oriented to the courts' views and the
question of executive autonomy in interpreting the Constitution arises” and describing such categories, such as
intelligence activities).
180
See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (rejecting effort to challenge federal
government’s general failure to adequately implement federal land statutes on the ground that “respondents cannot
seek wholesale improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the Department or the halls of Congress,
where programmatic improvements are normally made”); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependence of Internal and
External Separation of Powers, Emory L. J. forthcoming (manuscript at 12-14, 19-20) (emphasizing the importance
of internal constraints in improving agency decisionmaking and guarding against executive branch overreaching).
181
See Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the
Courts Reformed America's Prisons 16, 162-69 (1998) (describing efforts to increase professionalization and
adherence to dominant national standards for prison administration as a core part of prison reform litigation);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 1015, 1019-22, 1067-73 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of experimentalist institutional reform in which
stakeholders in public institutions negotiate remedies that are provisional and outcome-based, often leaving
institutions with broad discretion to determining how to meet them).
182
See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum.
L. Rev. 458, 475-78 (2001) (arguing that externally-imposed solutions cannot successfully address certain forms of
discrimination that are more structural and implicit because external rules “cannot be sufficiently sensitive to context
or integrated into . . . day-to-day practice,” discourage “proactive problem-solving,” and lead to an overemphasis on
avoiding liability).
183
See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1149--51 (2009) (finding plaintiffs cannot
show concrete an particularized injury based on specific regulations).
184
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350--55 (1996) (noting importance of right of access to court, but
finding inmate could not pursue claim because could not show actual injury).

110 Colum L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010)
35

Agencies also hold potential as sites for public deliberation and engagement on
constitutional meaning. Much recent constitutional scholarship has focused on extra-judicial
constitutional interpretation, particularly through the interaction of social movements with
political actors.185 Agencies play a critical role in these contexts, engaging with the same groups
and advocates as broad statutes and presidential statements are translated into concrete
policies.186 But agencies represent a prime locus for public interaction with government more
generally. Administrative officials regularly consult with interest groups and receive data and
filings from members of the public urging a particular course of action on the government.
Moreover, unlike Congress or the President, agencies are held to a duty to consider and respond
to the information submitted to them in setting policy—a duty enforced by the courts through
ordinary administrative law doctrines such as hard look review. As a result, administrative
proceedings also can be occasions in which to initiate popular discussion and deliberation about
what the Constitution requires and how constitutional demands should be met.187 These
understandings may then form an occasion for beneficial dialogue with the courts—and perhaps
with Congress and the President—about how the Constitution itself should be understood.
3.
Preserving political branch prerogatives.
Finally, any assessment of the
appropriateness of enforcing constitutional norms through ordinary administrative law must take
account of the alternatives. One possibility is, of course, that the Court will revert to only
assessing whether the administrative action at issue is actually unconstitutional, as the Fox
majority advocated.188 Although that option might appear to leave more room to agencies to
exercise the policymaking discretion delegated to them by Congress, its actual effect might be
quite opposite. Direct judicial constitutional enforcement may yield requirements that offer less
flexibility to the political branches in structuring government programs and policies. A standard
argument made in constitutional common law’s defense is that forcing courts to definitively
articulate the contours of constitutional rights and requirements risks “improvident
constitutionalization” and “imposing an inflexible regime upon Congress and the states.”189
Constitutional common law, by contrast, allows “[p]ressures for change [to be] accommodated
either by legislation or by an open reconsideration of the subconstitutional policy concerns
underlying an initial formulation of the rule.”190 Preserving the political branches’ flexibility in
185
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constructing administrative arrangements also supports judicial efforts to develop ordinary
administrative law doctrines to address constitutional concerns, such as the reasoned
decisionmaking requirement, rather than imposing hard and fast constitutional requirements.
Even Fox acknowledged, moreover, that one likely alternative to requiring that agencies
take constitutional concerns into account will be judicial enforcement of those concerns through
the mechanism of the constitutional canons, in particular the canon of constitutional
avoidance.191 Much recent scholarship on the constitutional canons has argued that, despite their
seemingly milder appearance, decisions applying the canons can be as intrusive on Congress—
indeed, perhaps more so—as decisions holding statutes to be unconstitutional.192 If these canons
are in fact doing any work, then they are yielding statutory interpretations different from the
reading that would otherwise obtain.193 The effect is to trump the political compromise that
underlay enactment of the measure initially; worse, the courts’ interpretation may change
political dynamics in a way that precludes easy enactment of clarifying or reversing legislation
by Congress.194 Whether or not the formal possibility of congressional reenactment deserves
more weight in the equation that these arguments allow,195 it is hard to dispute that application of
the canons can prove a substantial obstacle for Congress, given the difficulties involved in
getting federal legislation enacted.
Administrative agencies, however, can respond to judicial reversal more easily than
Congress. In part this is because, burdensome though administrative procedures can be, they do
not involve the same types of “vetogates” entailed in getting legislation through Congress and
signed by the President.196 Further, reversal of an agency decision on ordinary administrative
law grounds generally results in a remand to the agency; this is the standard course, for example,
when a court sets aside an agency determination as arbitrary and capricious.197 As a result, the
agency usually has to act in order to have the rule or decision in question take effect,198 and does
not confront the situation Congress may face after application of the canon of constitutional
avoidance: continuation of the challenged statute in place in a significantly altered form, but
without the political coalition to enact an override of the court’s decision. Moreover, although
formulation of rules and agency decisions may involve negotiation among many agency
personnel, they all at least ostensibly share the goal of formulating the best policy from the
agency’s perspective, and in the end the agency head frequently wields decisionmaking
authority. Thus, a partial remand of an agency decision does not pose the same danger of
overturning careful political compromises as does application of the canon of avoidance.
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An additional important advantage that agencies offer is their deep knowledge of the
substantive fields they regulate and the federal regulatory schemes in question.199 This
substantive expertise means that agencies are better equipped than courts to determine how to
incorporate constitutional values and norms with the least disruption to federal regulatory
schemes. Courts may have greater understanding and appreciation of constitutional values and
principles in general, but they are less competent in balancing constitutional and policy concerns
at a more granular level.200 Often several options will exist through which to address the
constitutional concerns raised by a statute or agency action. Rapanos v. United States provides a
recent illustration. That case involved the scope of federal regulation of intrastate wetlands and
the concern that such regulation might exceed constitutional limits on federal power. A number
of different regulatory approaches could address this danger. Two were suggested by the
plurality and concurrence, respectively: regulating only permanent bodies of water with a
continuous connection to waters of the United States,201 or undertaking a case-by-case
assessment of whether a particular wetland has a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable
waters.202 But other approaches were also available, such as exempting any wetlands and
tributaries not clearly navigable waters in their own right, or creating a rebuttable presumption
that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters or their tributaries are subject to regulation. The
federal agencies statutorily charged with implementing the Clean Water Act have the factual and
policy expertise needed to determine which of these possibilities best achieves federal water
pollution goals while respecting state authority.203
Those agencies’ greater political
accountability compared to courts also means that both the President and Congress will have
more openings for influencing this policy choice when undertaken in an administrative
context.204
C.

The Need for Greater Transparency

In sum, using ordinary administrative law to encourage administrative constitutionalism
not only accords with our constitutional structure and modern administrative reality, but also
represents an important tool for ensuring constitutional enforcement while also respecting
political branch prerogatives. For this approach to reap its hypothesized rewards, however, the
Court must be open about the relationship between constitutional law and ordinary
administrative law. Otherwise, agencies and courts will lack a clear understanding of agencies’
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obligation to take constitutional concerns into account, with underexploitation of administrative
capacity to address constitutional concerns the likely result.
Lack of transparency, unfortunately, is one of the defining hallmarks of the Court’s
precedent in this area. Not only has the Court not overtly developed ordinary administrative law
into a tool for constitutional enforcement, it has largely failed to identify the constitutional
concerns underlying its development of ordinary administrative law doctrines. This marks a
significant difference between the Court’s use of ordinary administrative law to address
constitutional concerns and its application of the constitutional canons. Critics of the canon of
constitutional avoidance frequently take the Court to task for failing to deeply engage with the
constitutional concerns leading to the canon’s application. But the Court at least identifies the
constitutional question at issue and states expressly that constitutional concerns are playing a role
in its statutory analysis.205 The Court is similarly overt when it applies constitutionally-derived
clear statement rules or presumptions.206 Even that degree of transparency is absent in the
Court’s development of ordinary administrative law.
To be sure, greater judicial candor and transparency can come at a price. A court’s
greater honesty about the concerns motivating its decisions may front unpalatable value choices,
raise obstacles to securing agreement on multimember bodies, or have worrying implications for
future decisions.207 Candor and transparency can also preclude certain results. As suggested
earlier, the Court’s silence likely reflects its discomfort with independent federal court
lawmaking when not constitutionally mandated, combined with its insistence on judicial
supremacy within the constitutional sphere.208 Perhaps the Court would not be willing to keep
developing ordinary administrative law as it has and pull back from current doctrines if forced to
confront the extent to which ordinary administrative law may be at odds with this understanding
of the proper bounds of the judicial role.209 My own view is that such a pullback is unlikely; the
constitutional concerns raised by the possibility of broad and unconstrained agency power run
too deep.
More importantly, the Court’s lack of transparency about the constitutional dimensions of
ordinary administrative law has significant costs as well---costs that go beyond simply failing to
exploit the beneficial potential of administrative constitutionalism. Of greatest concern, lack of
transparency is a serious impediment to both judicial and administrative accountability.210 The
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constitutional underpinnings of ordinary administrative law doctrines have remained largely
undeveloped and untested by criticism. We have little understanding of the extent to which
agency explanation and reasoning are constitutionally necessary conditions for delegation, or of
the basis on which such constitutional requirements can be justified. Critiques of current hard
look review, meanwhile, are incomplete insofar as they target only the doctrine’s statutory basis
or pragmatic implications without also assessing its putative constitutional basis. Lack of
judicial transparency also impedes administrative accountability; not only are the courts less
willing to probe how constitutional concerns factored into agency deliberations, but agencies
themselves have little incentive to identify and justify the influence such concerns had on their
decisionmaking.
This worsens the accountability risks associated with administrative
constitutionalism, as it becomes much harder for the public, Congress and the courts to police
agency constitutional reasoning and ensure that agencies do not base their decisions on
insubstantial constitutional concerns. To my mind, these potential gains of greater judicial
candor here outweigh its possible harms.
CONCLUSION
The time has therefore come for the Court to be forthright about the constitutional
character of ordinary administrative law. The linkages between constitutional law and ordinary
administrative are not only diverse, they are longstanding and deeply rooted in current doctrine.
Segregating constitutional law and administrative law would thus prove quite difficult and
disruptive. Worse, it would forego the significant benefits to be gained from encouraging
administrative agencies to take constitutional concerns seriously in their decisionmaking. Rather
than clinging to a false divide between constitutional law and ordinary administrative law, the
Court would do better to embrace this linkage and acknowledge the important role that
administrative agencies can and do play in the development of constitutional law.

